PSPD in English Archive 2003-11-08   2346

The Election and Strategies for Progressive Party

Lee Kwang Ho

(madger@kdlpnews.org)

Editor, Progressive Politics

After the end of World War Ⅱ the strong power of the U.S. and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula into two. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Korea had been threatened with colonization by neighboring countries, such as Russia, China, Japan, and even by the U.S. and England, which had strong naval military power. In the end, Korea was colonized by Japanese imperialism, which had been supported by the U.S. and England after Japan had defeated China and Russia.

International power relations around Korea did not change despite the collapse of Japanese imperialism. It couldn’t form a unified national state and was forced to accept a destiny of becoming divided into two nation states by its neighboring strong powers, at the same time as it was liberated from Japanese imperialism. The dividing line of the Korean peninsula has come to have both the meaning of a national dividing line between the north and south of Korea, and of an international boundary of the cold war period which was dominated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After the end of cold war period, Korea still has this legacy of the hostile cold war period and hostile relations between south and north regimes have fostered and increased inter-hatred. By doing so, they have been able to keep and consolidate each other’s social system.

The North Korean regime, based on its peculiar state-socialist principles, has considered the U.S. a hostile imperialism, so it has been natural for them that South Korea must be socialized and liberated from U.S. imperialism. On the contrary, pro-U.S and anti-communist-centered ruling forces in South Korea dominated all the groups of political opponents with democratic values over the forty years after the division and the Korean War. These hostile interdependent relations between south and north allowed each dominant regime to effectively oppress the voices of each resisting group. In that political context of South Korea, influential progressive and left groups and organizations could not act independently, because they were regarded as “the Reds”, and even all kinds of general democratic movements were oppressed by military dictatorships and anti-communist authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, these organizations, striving for a progressive and left-wing political party, have consistently acted as a politically independent arena among the groups in the movement for democracy. But they have had difficulties in making their influence felt here in South Korea because of the obvious presence of a traditional anti-communist and conservative political consciousness, derived from the hostile division and the civil war, in all the spheres of this area.

The 1987 socio-political system and the progressive movement for founding and consolidating a progressive political party

The June 1987 civil struggles and the workers’ great resistances that followed in July and August eventually forced the end of the South Korean authoritarian military regimes. Rapid economic growth during the developmental dictatorship era increased the middle-stratum, which longed for democracy. Also there had been tremendous discontent among the workers with an exploitative socio-ecionomic structure on the eve of its explosion.

Another factor in 1987’s civil and workers’ struggles for democratization was the leading roles of famous and non-military but conservative politicians such as Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. But 1987’s democratic space saw the split of the inter-movements’ bloc for democratization because of the above two leaders’ political rivalry just before that year’s presidential election. The character of this split was based not on policies and ideologies but on regional cleavages, and it was a direct cause of the victory of Roh Tae Woo, who came from the bloc of the military dictatorship. It is the political split between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam that is responsible for the negative legacy of regional cleavages.

In the context of these elements of Korean politics, therefore, the blockaded growth of progressive politics is derived from the general anti-communist complex and from those regional cleavages. Especially, the latter have set a political entry-wall before movements for a politically progressive party, since people have been accustomed to electing their representatives not by consistent policies or by the political orientations of each political party, but by regional birth or residence. In these political circumstances, the progressive groups striving for a politically independent party, who once had been part of comprehensive movements for democratization, diverged from the conservatives and the liberals after late 1987. But they suffered from a shortage of firmly supporting layers despite a few political experiments and trials. As a result, such progressives parties as the People’s Party that ran in the 1992 general election failed to be independent political powers.

The movements for a progressive party had a decisive turning point in their political growth in 1997. The founding of People’s Victory 21, mainly based on the democratic trade union movement (the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions), made a meaningful advance in the short history of progressive politics, because the KCTU would lead the movement for a progressive party. It had been able to perceive the importance of an independent political party which could be supported by workers, and it elected its candidate, Kwon Young Ghil, who was the first head of the KCTU, for the presidential election in December 1997. It meant not only that the KCTU, standing for the democratic trade union movements of Korea, regarded the founding of an independent political party for workers as its main task, but also that the movements for a progressive political party came to have more comprehensive supporting layers than before. While the presidential candidate of People’s Victory 21, Kwon Young Ghil, obtained only 1.2% (about 300,000 votes) of the total votes, People’s Victory 21 began the founding of a new progressive political party. Thus the Democratic Labor Party was founded mainly by the KCTU and militant people’s movements in January 2000. The DLP characterized itself as a political party with democratic socialist principles. It seems that the DLP’s rank-and-file base is not weak, despite there being the ideology of the ‘extensive coalition for democracy’, which has some influence on civil society in the name of blockading the domination of extreme right parties. There are various political views and sects within the DLP and it shows not only the principles of co-existence but also interior conflicts between political sects. But the organized labor and rank-and-file members of the DLP would not tolerate factional activities and amateurish party operation.

After the Founding of the DLP: Rising to Become the Third Political Party

The DLP ran for the first time in the general election in Apr. 2000, just after its founding. The main issues of this election were focused on the electorate’s reviews of the two-year IMF Restructuring Programs and on the elimination of corrupt politicians by civil movements. The judgement on the progressive political parties that raised anti-neoliberalist policies was also important for them. While the DLP failed to enter the National Parliament in this general election, political reviews of the party members and critics about the DLP differed from those of the People’s Party in the 1992 election, because the DLP candidates obtained about 40% of the votes in Ulsan and Chang Won, which are regarded as workers’ cities, and because they failed to be elected by only a small margin, and averaged 13% of the votes in running electoral districts. They began to think about the possibilities of getting votes by the class identity of labor. It was able to demonstrate its democratic party operation, characterized by a voluntary party member fee and the direct election of official candidates.

One of the important issues of that election was ‘the Campaign to Eliminate Corrupt Politicians’, which was led by a coalition of civil movement groups. This campaign was noticed and supported by many people, but it caused a complex controversy among the progressive blocs, including the DLP and the KCTU. Such reviews as the one below could speak for many critical views of this campaign: “Although the Campaign for the Elimination of Corrupt Politicians could have played a positive role in organizing mass discontent with corrupt conservative politics, it played a negative role by reducing people’s political discontents to just the sphere of corrupt politicians’ individual personalities, thereby distorting a perfect reform direction.” Behind such critical reviews lay a political perspective that the Elimination Campaign gave an indulgence to the conservative spheres of politics which are the cause of corrupt politics, and had a negative influence on the growth of progressive politics.

After this election, the DLP became very well aware that the grass-roots grounds of the party are the mass workers and people, and since then it has strengthened its solidarity with the trade unions and at the same time has consolidated various local organizations under its flag of progressive politics. It is a striking record in the history of the progressive party movements that the effective membership of the DLP is about 30,000. Now the DLP is making efforts to highlight the differentiation of its policies and ideology.

These efforts of the DLP bore meaningful fruit in the municipal election in June 2002. It obtained an average 12.8% of the votes in running electoral districts and a number of its candidates were elected as members of municipal parliaments and as presidents of municipal offices. Especially, it obtained 8.1% of the national votes, and was able to become the third party of Korean politics due to the introduction of a new electoral system of party listing. It showed the possibility that it could overcome a Korean tendency to vote by regional birth and residence because the votes for the DLP had a nationwide distribution. These positive outcomes resulted from its consolidating local parties, strengthening solidarity with trade union movements and developing policies for the poor related to the problems of housing and finance. As a result, the DLP was able to become the first progressive political party in the modern political history of Korea that has the right to receive government subsidies for political parties and elections.

Now the DLP, as the third political party, is rising to become one of the main politicial actors that will have an influence on the presidential election in December 2002.

The Presidential Election in December 2002 and the Strategies of the DLP

This presidential election will be the first one for the DLP. The the media has given increased attention to the DLP since the victories in the above municipal elections. Its opportunities to participate in the political discussions which are held by major TV networks and newspapers are increasing. It means that the DLP needs to raise reasonable policies and ideologies before the general electorate. The present main candidates for the presidency are Lee Hoi-chang from the Grand National (Hannara) Party, which is the main conservative opponent party, Nho Mu-hyun from the ruling Democratic Party, Jung Mong-jun from the Korean Jaebul (and Hyundai Heavy Industry’s former head), and Kwon Young Ghil of the DLP. The other three candidates differ from Kwon in their main policies in relation to the privatization of parts of the public sector, disposal of state-owned companies, complimentary treatment for foreign investment, and flexible systems for the labor market. There are few differences between the above three, excluding Kwon of the DLP, because they basically agree with those neoliberalist policies.

But many political critics predict that the ‘vote orientation by regional identity’ rather than vote by policies and political ideology will have a great influence on the election results. For the DLP it means that the continuation of voter orientation by regional identity will make successful growth of progressive parties difficult. The DLP”s main strategies for this election are focused on criticizing neoliberalist policies that have threatened people’s lives and increased the gap between the poor and the rich, and on promoting ‘vote by class identity’. The DLP’s political attitudes toward the U.S. are more critical than those of the conservative parties. It recognizes that the U.S. is willing to threaten the peaceful mood between north and south Korea and to demonize the north under the flag of international anti-terrorism. It is important, therefore, for the DLP that its political identity can be seen as a courageous political force that would say “no” to the U.S., which is enforcing unilateral foreign policies. In relation to this issue, the conservative political powers of south Korea intend to acquire political advantages by describing political opponents as ‘the red pro-north Korea forces’. The DLP regards revealing their malicious activities as one of its main tasks.

The other political tasks of the DLP are forming itself as an alternative political party and unifying various political groups which are not contained within influential areas of the DLP through this presidential election. The DLP’s organizational aims are increasing party membership and consolidating its local organizations.

Above all, it is important that the DLP must actively present the struggles of workers, farmers, and the urban poor for secure lives, and keep showing its political identity not as a parliamentarist party but as a militant political party. In south Korea, neoliberalist policies, led by the Kim Dae Jung government and supported by the IMF and the WTO, has caused the lives of the people to deteriorate. Casual workers who occupy over 50% of the total are on the verge of insecure employment. The DLP must present a receptivity to their needs.

There is little practical possibility of the DLP candidate winning the presidency. It aims to obtain over 5% (1,250,000) of the total votes (25,000,000). It will have to prepare for the next general election in 2004 with meaningful experience from this election.

The progressive political parties of south Korea have not been able to enter the National Parliament until now, but most observers predict the possibility of the DLP’s entering the National Parliament in next general election because of its grass-roots base, because of extensive disgust with conservative party systems, and because of the introduction of a new party listing system.

The history of progressive political party movements is short in length and shallow in depth in south Korea. However, the DLP, differs from progressive parties that have disappeared, and it is growing as a sustainable political party by broadening its solidarity with people at the grass-roots. It is on the historical way to improving the lives of people and seeking peace around the Korean Peninsula.

Lee Kwangho

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