PSPD in English Peace/Disarmament 2010-11-24   2138

[Int’l Workshop for Peace and Disarmament] Can Japan Overcome Cold-War Thinking?(Kawasaki Akira)

Session1. Security Policies and Civil Priorities in the Asia-Pacific Region

 

Can Japan Overcome Cold-War Thinking?

Akira KAWASAKI / Peace Boat

Introduction

This paper will first summarize the recent Japanese governmental and expert analysis about the security environment surrounding Japan and the general direction of its security policy, by reviewing its Defense White Paper and the most recent report by an advisory panel to the Prime Minister. It will then analyze the global contexts with which such developments in security policies are associated. Finally, it will recommend key priorities and shifts in Japanese policies, with the creation of a lasting peace mechanism in Northeast Asia in view. The key questions are: How can Japan overcome the remnant Cold-War thinking? How does the process relate to globalization and the global shift in power? How can the region create a peace mechanism which relies less on the US or Japan’s hegemonic military powers?

Japan’s 2010 Defense White Paper

Japan’s Defense White Paper Defense of Japan 2010 starts with the analysis that the international security environment has become “complicated and uncertain” due to factors such as 1) the rise of nations against the backdrop of economic growth in recent years; 2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 3) activities by international terrorist organizations and other non-state actors; and 4) the danger of fragile nations becoming hotbeds for international terrorism.

Particular emphasis is given to the recent change in the international strategic balance, namely, the comparative decrease in US influence against the rise of growing new powers such as China, India and Russia. The White Paper reads:

It has been pointed out that in the future the comparative superiority of the United States will decline in terms of military and other areas, but it seems that it will continue to be the most influential nation in the international community. … In the future, the relative international influence of these multi-polar-oriented countries [such as China, India and Russia] is expected increase.

It then lists “major security issues in the international community” as follows:

 ▪ The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as their delivery means, including ballistic missiles
 ▪ Globally dispersed cells of international and local terrorist organizations
 ▪ Outer space and cyber space, noting, “Cyber attacks on information and telecommunications networks can have a serious impact on people’s lives.”
 ▪ Regional conflicts and UN peacekeeping operations (PKO)
 ▪ Safety of maritime transportation, in light of the recent increase in acts of piracy
 ▪ Large-scale disasters and outbreaks of epidemics

The White Paper summarizes that the international community now confronts a range of issues “from traditional inter-state relations to new threats and diverse contingencies.” It also states that the role of military forces are “diversifying.” It reads, “unified responses that incorporate military as well as diplomatic, police, judicial, information, and economic measures are becoming necessary.” It also notes the importance of “international cooperation and partnership in security areas” in order to respond to the diversified roles of the military.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, it recognizes that the rapid economic growth of China and India has brought “global attention” to the region and “enhanced coordination and cooperation” among countries. But at the same time, “conflicts between countries/regions remain, even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe,” the White Paper points out, and “long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to plague the region.”

 North Korea, China and Russia

The White Paper pays particular attention to the three countries of North Korea, China and Russia. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs remain as top concerns. It reads, “This cannot be accepted as it is a notable hazard to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and international community,” It also refers to the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010 and various international responses. It made clear that Japan aligns itself with South Korea, by referring to the G8 summit statement of June and the UNSC Presidential Statement of July as “critical of North Korea for its attack and sinking,” as well as to the US-South Korea joint military exercises in this context.

As for China, the White Paper warns of the “further modernization of its military capabilities against the backdrop of the continuing rapid growth of its defense budget.” It also cautiously points out increased Chinese activities in waters closed to Japan. Against these developments, the White Paper views the “lack of transparency” of defense policies and military activities of China as “a matter of concern.” It calls for “further improvements to transparency regarding China’s military” and proposes “promoting dialogues and exchanges with China” in order to build confidence.

Russian President Medvedev is, the White Paper analyzes, “developing its military posture in line with its resources against the backdrop of its economic development.” It notes that the country is “downsizing troops” but “modernizing its military,” including the development and introduction of new equipment. In the wake of its recent “global deployment” of the military, the White Paper warns, “Russia continues with active operations of its vessels and aircraft” in the Far East, too.

 PM’s Advisory Panel Report

In August 2010, the Council of Defense Capabilities in the New Era, an advisory panel to the Prime Minister, submitted to Naoto Kan after its half-year activity a report entitled “Japan’s Vision for Future Defense Capabilities in the New Era.”  The panel, chaired by Shigeo Sato and composed of business leaders and experts on security and international studies, was mandated to study for a revision of National Defense Program Guidelines. The present Guidelines were adopted by the Cabinet in 2004. A revision was planned under the PM Taro Aso of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009. But then, as the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power, the process was postponed for a year. In early 2010, Yukio Hatoyama established the panel as the first advisory body on security policy to the PM under the DPJ government.

The panel’s report pointed to recent trends in the global security environment as 1) economic and social globalization posing cross-border challenges and increased “conflicts in between peacetime and wartime,” 2) the shift in the international power balance with rising new powers against the decreased influence of the US, 3) the increased danger posed by WMDs and their delivery systems, and 4) continued threats of regional conflicts, failed states, terrorism and transnational crimes.

In responding to these challenges, the report recommended that Japan aims to become a “peace creation country” that is more actively engaged in fields such as international peace cooperation, non-traditional security and human security. It recommended, while ensuring the US extended deterrence, that Japan make efforts to employ diverse diplomatic means, engage with new growing powers and strengthen multilateral security frameworks in order to achieve its security goals.

 Challenging the Article 9-Based Policies

The report made two notable recommendations. One was that Japan should go beyond the Basic Defense Force Concept that it has long held as the basis of security policy. The Basic Defense Force Concept is explained as a concept to focus on “preventing invasion by possessing adequate scale of defense force,” in addition to relying on the Japan-US security arrangement.  This relates to the “exclusively-defense oriented policy” that Japan has been committed to under Article 9 of its Constitution. The report argues, however, that such “static” deterrence cannot meet today’s security challenges and that “dynamic” deterrence –with active surveillance and patrol, demonstrating high operational capability even in peacetime– is increasingly needed. The report recommended, instead of sticking to the concept oriented to defend against invasion, that “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces” should be pursued.

The other was that the report clearly recommended that Japan revise the arms-export-ban principle which it has committed since the late 1960s.  This principle has been another unique policy of Japan under its Peace Constitution, despite being eased to exclude the transfer of military technologies to the US in the 1980s and, more recently, missile defense related exports to the US. The report represented the voices of business sectors which have been actively lobbying for a fundamental revision of the arms-export-ban principle.  This report serves only as “one reference” for the government to revise formal national policy.  However, a study process of “reviewing and re-establishing” the arms export policy started within the DPJ after the issuance of the report.

It is remarkable that the panel’s report did not make any significant changes from the previous LDP government in its analysis of today’s security agenda or the orientation of policy to be taken. Going away from the Basic Defense Force Concept towards more flexible and proactive forces is in line with the direction already taken by the 2004 revision of National Defense Program Guidelines.  The change of the government from the LDP to the DPJ did not bring about any significant change in the composition of the expert group – or “brain” — for security policy. Former high ranking foreign and defense officials also joined the panel as advisors. Thus the continuity of defense-policy-making is being ensured despite the governmental change.

 Keeping the Old, Investing in the New

Japan’s security policy today can be characterized as keeping the old approach but at the same time investing in new approaches. The old approach, which in essence is to prevent invasion by surrounding enemies – bearing Russia, China and North Korea in mind – was formed during the Cold War. A defensive approach against invasion has long been the decisive factor of the composition of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Indeed, Northeast Asia is the only region in the world with Cold War structures remaining, represented by the division on the Korean Peninsula and the problem of the Taiwan(Province of China) Strait. As the Defense White Paper points out, “unlike Europe,” where regional integration has prevailed and people are more concerned with intra-state conflicts and violence, traditional state-to-state tensions are still key for Japan and other Northeast Asian countries. Recent provocative news over territorial disputes between Japan and China and Russia recall that the region is still caught within Cold War divisions.

The Japan-US security arrangement is still seen as the most important base for Japan’s security. The US extended deterrence is used as a pretense for almost anything within security discussions of Japan. PM Hatoyama tried to make a difference in the US bases in Okinawa, by revisiting the 2006 agreement with the US on the relocation of the Futenma airbase to Henoko. However, he faced severe bashing by security experts both in Japan and the US, claiming he was doing harm to the Japan-US alliance. He was not talented enough to present a plan that could gain a public support, but rather lost trust from Okinawa. Thus he was cornered into quitting.

On the nuclear front, as the 2009 Prague speech of Barack Obama has generated a new global momentum for nuclear disarmament, Japan is actually slowing down the process by stressing the need of being protected by nuclear weapons.  Recent international debates have made clear that the LDP government resisted the adoption of a no-first use policy of nuclear weapons or the retirement of Tomahawk missiles in US nuclear policy planning.  The DPJ government, initiated by then Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, disclosed in March 2010 the secret Japan-US agreement over the transit of nuclear-equipped vessels during the Cold War. It also signaled to the US that Japan would not oppose the US retirement of Tomahawk missiles from the region, which was then realized in the US Nuclear Posture Review Report of April 2010. Yet, even the DPJ leadership is not strong enough to change the government’s traditional policy that Japan needs a first-use option of nuclear weapons by the US to make the extended deterrence “reliable” for Japan.

 New Roles for the Military

While such Cold-War thinking still plays a vital role in Japan’s policy-making, new changes are also emerging. First, the increasing dangers of regional conflicts and terrorism engaging non-state actors are driving Japanese security planners to think outside of the Cold-War box. Active participation in international peace operations, flexible and responsive forces, and a diversified role for the military, including operations in peacetime and the cooperation of civilians are, along with other similar trends described in the Defense White Paper and the experts’ report above, understood in the same context.

It also should be noted that Japanese defense officials are increasingly referring to climate change and natural disasters as important security threats and reasons for the SDF to be well prepared. One is reminded of similar trends in the 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review regarding the increased role of the military in dealing with climate change.  Setting aside the cynical question of whether this represents a militar search for a raison d’etre as the likelihood of state-to-state wars is decreasing, there is a clear sign of a cross-border integration of military forces in the wake of economic and social globalization. Distinctions between military activities in wartime and peacetime, and between national forces and international forces, are thus blurred.

A New Cold War?

Secondly, both Japanese government and experts focus on the shift in strategic balance, or the decrease of US influence in light of the rise of China, India, Russia etc. This trend is in line with the shift in world economy ruling from the G8 to G20. Against this trend, both Foreign and Defense Ministries first stress the need to “strengthen the ties with the countries that share values,” meaning a strengthened relationship with South Korea, Australia and India. This poses the risk of constituting a “containment” strategy of China – or being interpreted by China as such – by  forming a “liberal chain” of Japan-South Korea-Australia-India surrounding China. This leads to the risk of a new Cold War.

For example, in the ongoing debate over nuclear cooperation with India, proponents often refer to the “merit” of checking China by fueling India through nuclear cooperation.  The government is also talking about broader dialogue with China and Russia, and strengthening East Asian frameworks including the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3 and others. However, such arguments for creating a regional security mechanism engaging China are not as strong as the increased voice for strengthened cooperation among the “free and democratic” camp.

2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the present Japan-US Security Treaty. Both governments agreed to “deepen” the security arrangement on this historic occasion.  How the governments define “deepening” of the security arrangement is still unclear. However, the above points constitute  the background of the discussion.

 Recommendations:  Shifting Security Arrangements in the Region

The fact that the governments did not choose the word “strengthening” but rather chose “deepening” of the Japan-US security relations paved a way for engagement by civil society. With critical viewpoints, civil society can constructively present ideas in the process of redefining the Japan-US security relations, in search of a lasting peace in the region.

The first is to stop creating a new Cold War, and instead work for an East Asia Peace Community. The creation of new tensions with China, backed by an outdated Cold-War discourse, would not be constructive. A cautious approach is needed, because such a trend might also be driven by sentiment of rivalry against the Chinese economy by Japanese people affected by a long recession. Broader and deeper engagement with China should be pursued, so that the DPJ government’s agenda of an East Asia Community will cover not only economic cooperation but also the creation of new confidence-building, arms control and disarmament mechanisms. The Six-Party Talks process on the Korean Peninsula is also encouraged to resume in view of working towards the creation of a lasting regional mechanism, as agreed to in the 2005 Joint Statement.

The second is to make a difference in nuclear disarmament. Japan’s attachment to Cold-War type nuclear deterrence, which looks likely to be followed by South Korea, is counterproductive not only for the global nuclear disarmament process but also for the future of Northeast Asia security. Any “Deepening” of Japan-US security arrangements should be designed to dramatically reduce, i the nuclear component from the bilateral security arrangement, with a view to eliminating it altogether. This would work constructively in pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, and in encouraging China to take further disarmament steps. A Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone should be made as a common policy objective in the region. Japan can and should take the initiative, as the country which experienced the suffering and devastation of nuclear weapons.

The third is to stop the militarization of the economy. As indicated above, the distinction between military and civilians is becoming more and more blurred, both in field operations and industries. Business leaders are pushing the agenda of lifting the ban on arms exports. They argue that promoting the “competitiveness” of high-tech industry is vital for the future of Japan’s economy, suggesting that joint ventures with US and European companies in fields related to advanced military-civil integrated industries would benefit Japan.

The moral case against this must be clearly made, remembering that Japan’s post-war “prosperity” was, in part, built upon the principle of economic development without relying on the military, in line with its Peace Constitution. (It is also true, though, that the “prosperity” was, in other part, build upon the sacrifices of those who suffered from the Korean War and Okinawan bases, off the Japanese mainland.) But critical examination should also be made as to whether such a leaning towards the military would really benefit Japan’s economy, considering the very small ratio of military sectors within the whole economy of Japan and the potential loss of trust as a “peaceful nation” by the Middle East or other areas of the world.

And last but not least, civil society can seriously think of how to contribute to “non-traditional security,” relating to such issues as crime, piracy, pandemics, disasters and climate change, without relying on national military forces. The military is now searching for a renewed meaning for existence as global threats are becoming less and less military-oriented, but more and more socio-economic centered. Innovative civil society approaches should be developed and implemented, crossing national borders. This will prevent the emergence of additional excuses for retaining large military spending and upgrading military forces with new missions. As globalization poses serious new threats of poverty and violence globally, there must not be any additional excuses for retaining remnants of the Cold War. East Asia should use its advanced economy and resources to contribute to the global common interest.  ☼

◯ Akira KAWASAKI / Japan

Akira Kawasaki is an Executive Committee member of the Tokyo-based NGO Peace Boat <www.peaceboat.org>. Having worked with a Japanese NGO Peace Depot in 1998-2002, he advocates for nuclear disarmament currently as a Vice Chair of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and a Global Council member of Abolition 2000. Since 2008, Kawasaki coordinates “Global Voyage for a Nuclear-Free World: Peace Boat Hibakusha Project” that the atomic-bomb survivors travel around the world to raise public awareness on nuclear danger. In 2009 he served as an NGO Advisor to Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). He plays an active role in facilitating policy dialogue between Japanese government and civil society on disarmament. His book Kaku Kakusan (Nuclear Proliferation), Iwanami Shoten, 2003, Tokyo, received the First Peace Promotion Prize of the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) in June 2006. He was a principal translator of the Japanese version of the 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) Report Weapons of Terror. kawasaki@peaceboat.gr.jp.

 

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