PSPD in English Archive 2001-07-31   1282

15 June South-North Joint Declaration, Peace Agreement and Disarmament

15 June South-North Joint Declaration, Peace Agreement and Disarmament

Kim Nak-jung

 

I. Introduction

Today we commemorate the first anniversary of the 6.15 North-South Joint Declaration which was announced last year at the North-South summit meeting. Following this historic event we wondered if this was a faint sign of the beginning of a new era for our nation that has endured such a long history of hardship and suffering. However today we realize that we still have a long road ahead of us and that our journey is constantly hindered by gusty winds. The heartfelt excitement that was felt at the time of the declaration is nowhere to be found, replaced once again by the icy currents of the Cold War. However we cannot be disheartened. Since I believe that history is demanding a clear change we have to look reality in the eye. At this turning point in history I invite you to think about what we can and must do to end the state of Cold War of the past fifty years, establish peace, and realize the ideals of the 6.15 Declaration for the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.

2. Significance and Problems of the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration

The historical significance of the South-North Joint Declaration is as follows:

First, South and North Korea, which have continued a hostile confrontation with the backing of their respective allies, have reaffirmed to work together independently for national reunification. It is especially significant that the leaders of the two Koreas have reaffirmed the principle of national independence, in the belief that the unification of Korea will not be given by outside powers but has to be achieved by the independent efforts of Koreans themselves.

Second, the South-North joint Declaration has great significance because it is a promise to make an important turnabout of the hostile policies the South and North have pursued for the past half century. Article 2 of the Joint Declaration stipulates that the South and the North, recognizing that the reunification proposal of South Korea (the confederation formula) and that of North Korea (the lower stage of the federation formula) have something in common, will try to achieve national reunification along these lines. This means that the South and the North will no longer denounce each other’s unification formula as deceitful tactics to overthrow each other. By this article, the South and the North have pledged not to pursue hegemony over each other’s domain any more but to recognize each other’s power entity. They have also decided to pursue a unified nation through confederation or federation of the two states of the South and North.

Third, the South-North Joint Declaration has a great significance in that it does not stop at simply declaring principles but takes specific measures for confidence building between the South and the North (Articles 3, 4, 5). More exchanges and cooperation are needed to restore confidence between peoples who have been mutually antagonistic.

Despite the historical significance of the South-North Declaration described above, however, it also contains several problems that have to be solved.

First, the Joint Declaration lacks the prerequisite for establishing peace on the Korean peninsula, which is indispensable for dissolving the hostile relationship between the South and the North and for achieving peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity between them. Both the South and the North are still under the armistice agreement signed in July 1953 after the three years of bitter war. This armistice regime has yet to be replaced by a peace agreement. Nevertheless, the South-North Joint Declaration does not provide anything for the termination of the Korean War or control and reduction of armaments between the South and the North. This omission greatly limits the historical importance of the Joint Declaration that is said to have transformed the inter-Korean relationship from hostility to peaceful coexistence.

Second, the Joint Declaration was signed by the heads of states representing the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea respectively. However, the Declaration is silent about the issue of both sides’ recognizing each other as a national entity. So far the South and the North have refused to recognize each other as a state. But the Joint Declaration has recognized that there is a point of sameness in the reunification formulae of the two Koreas and pledged to strive for national reunification on these lines. What sameness meant was the compound-state unification formula, which presupposes recognition of each other as a national entity. Nevertheless, Article 4 of South Korean Constitution and Article 1 of North Korean Constitution both provide that all Korean territory and its inhabitants belong to each one’s country. However, unless these constitutional provisions are revised, the South-North Joint Declaration will conflict with them. Both South and North Korea have yet to show their respective positions more clearly on the issue of recognizing each other as a national entity

Third, although the Joint Declaration has pledged the South and the North to push for various exchanges and cooperation between them, such exchanges and cooperation may sooner or later come to a deadlock, unless those issues of peace agreement, disarmament, and mutual recognition of each other’s entity are solved. Even if an increase of exchange and cooperation is a necessary condition for peaceful reunification, it is not a sufficient condition for peaceful unification. When each side seeks overthrow of the other side, exchange and cooperation can be used as a dangerous tool for it. Therefore, if the South-North Joint Declaration is to become a really significant document for peace and reunification of Korea, it must lead to a peace agreement and disarmament negotiated at the second or third or fourth summit meeting between the South and the North. The two sides also have to undertake to provide a basic legal framework for peaceful coexistence by revising their respective constitutions.

3. Parties to a Peace Agreement and Its Contents

When belligerents want to conclude a peace agreement to end a war, they have to participate in a peace conference where the following issues will be discussed and agreed upon: 1) delimit border lines; 2) exchange of war prisoners and remains of the war dead; 3) postwar reduction of armament; 4) handling of war criminals; 5) compensation for war damages; 6) postwar normalization of diplomatic relations, etc. However, for converting the armistice agreement to a peace agreement, the Korean War has some special problems that are not seen in ordinary wars between nations. For the United States, the Korean War was clearly an international war. But it had the character of a civil war or an internal war for Koreans in the South and the North. China said it dispatched only volunteer soldiers to fight in the Korean civil war instead of a war between nations. As the Korean War had such complexity, the following somewhat complicated problems will inevitably arise in replacing the existing armistice regime with a peace agreement.

First, who will be the parties to the peace agreement?

The Korean War of June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953 was a war between North Korea and China (volunteers army) on the one side, and United Nations forces comprised of South Korea, the United States, and other 15 nations on the other. The armistice agreement was signed by the Commander of North Korean People’s Army and the Commander of China’s Volunteers Army on the one side and the Commander of the United Nations forces on the other. Therefore, Pyongyang contends that North Korea and the United States should be the sole parties to a peace agreement replacing the armistice agreement, arguing that China’s Volunteer Army has already withdrawn from the Korean peninsula and the Commander of UN forces is none other than an American general. On the other hand, Seoul insists that a peace agreement should be signed by South and North Korea and guaranteed by the U.S. and China.

It is however clear that the real and major parties to the Korean war were South and North Korea, the United States and China. Therefore, I think a peace agreement ending the Korean War should be negotiated at the four-party talks of South and North Korea, the U.S., and China, if the peace agreement is to resolve a hostile relationship between the belligerents. Of course, China may be excluded from the peace agreement if China says its participation is unnecessary because it has already normalized relations with the U.S. and South Korea, which it fought against in the Korean War. However, Pyongyang’s insistence on excluding South Korea from the peace agreement and Seoul’s proposal for not making the U.S. a party to the peace agreement are both inappropriate. This is because a hostile confrontation continues between the South Korean army and the U.S. forces on the one hand, and North Korean army on the other, and a peace agreement without participation of these three countries cannot be a real one. In particular, what meaning will a peace agreement have if the U.S. does not become a party to it despite the fact that the commander of U.S. forces in Korea exercises operational control over the South Korean army in wartime.

Second, what contents should a peace agreement have?

1) Demarcation of border: Both South and North do not recognize each other as a separate nation, so there is no question of boundary demarcation between them. However, a borderline must exist between two states. Furthermore, as Seoul and Pyongyang are both members of the United Nations, they must have a jurisdictional borderline that each side must respect like a national boundary. But the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed in 1992 stipulates that the two sides should regard and respect the military demarcation line drawn by the armistice as an administrative boundary within which each political entity exercises jurisdiction. Therefore, delimitation between the South and North will not be so difficult. But the territorial water lines, which the Korean armistice agreement has not defined clearly, remain to be fixed.

2) Exchange of war prisoners and remains of the war dead: The issue of exchanging war prisoners and remains of the war dead can be definitely settled between the United States and North Korea, but it is very complicated between South and North Korea. There are former North Korean prisoners who have chosen to live in the South, so-called anti-communist warriors , and there are former South Korean prisoners who have opted to remain in the North, the so-called liberation warriors . Local newspapers have recently repeatedly raised the issue of South Korean prisoners of war in the North. As they are different in character from war prisoners between nations, however, they have to be dealt with as part of separated families reunion projects. Thus, the issue of exchanging prisoners and remains of the war dead between the South and the North cannot be dealt with in the peace agreement. It has instead to be settled between Seoul and Pyongyang. Only the issue of Chinese war prisoners and remains of the war dead may be discussed at the four-party talks but, since Seoul and Beijing have already established diplomatic relations, the issue could also be settled bilaterally between them. 

As those Chinese prisoners who refused to be repatriated to mainland China were all sent to Taiwan, Province of China, they will not become an issue, but returning of remains of Chinese war dead could be discussed between Seoul and Beijing. 

3) Postwar disarmament. Because the Chinese Volunteer Army withdrew from North Korea a long time ago, the question of Korean disarmament will have to be discussed between South Korea, the U.S., and North Korea. The peace agreement which the four-party talks will negotiate may stipulate that the question of disarmament should be dealt with by a three-party military commission to be composed of South Korea, the U.S., and North Korea. However, North Korea, which finds the arms race quite burdensome for them, will not recognize the importance of a peace agreement for the termination of the Korean War, unless the U.S. becomes one of the parties to the agreement, and unless the change of status of U.S. forces in Korea as well as a reduction of armaments involving South and North Korea and the U.S. forces in Korea are dealt with in the agreement.

4) War criminals 

 

5) Compensation for war damages: These two issues will not be discussed as 47 years have passed under the armistice regime. I think that the questions of war guilt or compensation cannot be discussed because the Korean War is a civil war in nature.

6) Normalization of diplomatic relations after the war: Among the parties to the Korean War, she United States and North Korea are the only countries yet to normalize their bilateral relations. They have already agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in the 1994 Geneva Accord on Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The reason why implementation of this agreement is being delayed is due to the U.S. strategy toward North Korea. It seems therefore difficult to realize a peace agreement unless the U.S. strategy toward Pyongyang changes.

4. Necessity and Possibility of Disarmament

In his 1998 presidential inauguration speech and in his interview with the local newspaper Hankyoreh on its 10th anniversary, President Kim Dae Jung said that the South and the North can discuss their disarmament in accordance with the inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1992. Nevertheless, the two sides have not yet even discussed this issue. Furthermore, national defense expenditures of Seoul have not at all decreased since his inauguration, and despite the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration. What is the reason for this? I do not think this is because the South and the North Korean authorities still have the intention to unify each other by force or that they lack the will for mutual disarmament. I think they no longer have such an intention because they know at least that a renewed outbreak of a war between the South and the North means the total destruction of the Korean people, in view of the enormous destructive military power accumulated on the Korean peninsula during the past 50 years. Disarmament on the Korean peninsula cannot be achieved without an agreement between all the adversaries on the peninsula, and the United States, which is one of them, by no means wants a reduction of the Korean government’s defense spending. 

At present, the South-North confrontation on the Korean peninsula means a confrontation between the South Korean army plus the U.S. forces in Korea on the one hand and the North Korean army on the other. But the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1992 is an accord only between South Korea and North Korea, and the U.S. is not a party to it. Therefore, President Kim’s remarks that disarmament can be discussed in accordance with the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1992 was misjudged, because the military commission and non-aggression agreement provided for in the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement are by no means a framework to discuss the issue of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea or a reduction of U.S. forces in Korea.

When he visited the United States in March 2001, President Kim, calling for a package deal with North Korea under the principle of comprehensive reciprocity, proposed that North Korean nuclear and missiles problem should be settled between Pyongyang and Washington, while the issue of conventional weapons as well as inter-Korean disarmament should be settled between Seoul and Pyongyang, in accordance with the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. But his proposal clearly has limits. As mentioned earlier, at present the hostile confrontation between the South and the North is that between the North Korean army and the South Korean army plus the U.S. forces in Korea. Then, what meaning will it have to discuss disarmament on the Korean peninsula without including the issue of U.S. forces in Korea? The reality is that, in an emergency, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea exercises operational control over South Korean forces. Therefore, it is by no means realistic to negotiate disarmament only under the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. Again, Korean disarmament cannot be achieved between Seoul and Pyongyang without also dealing with the U.S. forces in Korea.

During the last days of the Clinton administration, the U.S. and North Korea were reportedly nearing agreement on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile problems. But now some figures in the U.S. Republican government are voicing against normalizing relations with Pyongyang, citing the forward deployment of North Korean army as the proof of North’s threat of southward aggression. But this kind of assertion is nothing but a demand for unilateral disarmament by North Korea. The reasons for North Korea’s forward deployment are: first, for North Korea confronting the U.S. nuclear striking power and the strongest air force in the world, deployment of its forces nearest to its enemy would be the only way to avoid the enemy’s bombing and nuclear attack. Second, for North Korea, short of roads and transportation facilities, forward deployment of its forces is the only way to counter the attacks by U.S. forces having air supremacy and high maneuverability, as well as by South Korean forces.

For both South Korea that has experienced an economic crisis and North Korea where a number of people died of starvation, no task is more urgent than reducing their armaments to improve their standard of living. Then why has even the discussion of an arms cut not started between them since the issuance of the South-North Joint Declaration?

Currently, the Bush administration is pushing for the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system allegedly to protect itself and its allies from missile attacks from so-called rogue states. However, isn’t the military-industrial complex of the U.S., trying to increase their sale of weapons, opposed to any development that may lead to the reduction of military spending in South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, Province of China, and other countries?

Whatever excuses the United States may bring forward, we cannot but think that the current lack of progress in negotiating a peace agreement and armament reduction on the Korean peninsula is due to the U.S. Republican government’s policy of not desiring dissolution of the hostile relations between the South and the North. The last thing the US military-industrial complex might want would be a world in peace where there is no need for weapons.

5. Conclusion

The June 15th South-North Joint Declaration was a very significant event for opening a new era of coexistence and co-prosperity between the South and the North by ending the fratricidal conflict between them that has continued for a half century. But the Joint Declaration has left important tasks over to the second, third, or fourth inter-Korean summit meetings. These are replacing the existing armistice regime with a peace agreement and putting an end to the wasteful arms race.

However, at present even making a South-North Peace Declaration seems to be difficult, not to mention a peace agreement. Discussion on South-North disarmament would be meaningless without also dealing with the issue of changing the status of U.S. forces in Korea as well as of their phased reduction. Thus, we are concerned that, unless the Bush administration makes some change to its North Korea policies, the expected visit to Seoul of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for the second inter-Korean summit meeting may not take place, decapitating the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration.

Modern and contemporary history is interspersed with frequent wars. Whatever the professed reasons for these wars may be, I think they have mainly to do with the money-making of defense industries. For them money took the place of the God. Those who made money in wars preached that, for securing national security and peace, it is necessary to be prepared for wars by procuring better weapons, and, when the opportunity arises, by beating the adversaries. They never said that reconciliation with neighboring states was the way to guarantee security and peace.

But I firmly believe that the surest way to avoid wars and guarantee peace and security is to dissolve hostile relations with neighboring countries and seek reconciliation with them. This will be particularly important to adversarial compatriots who have shared blood for thousand years. The surest way for one country to have security and peace would not be to acquire more military power with better weaponry, but to pardon and reconcile with its adversarial brethren. Only this way will correspond to the will of God manifested to us through Jesus Christ.

Today’s reality for the Korean nation seems to be quite serious. But the destiny of a nation should not indefinitely be left to the interests of big powers. Our nation in the South and North should be united in the spirit of national independence in order to overcome this reality wisely. To instigate antagonism between brethren is what weapon sellers want. I believe that nobody can nullify the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration if each side refrains from slandering the other and seeks a maximum reconciliation and cooperation with the other in the spirit of placing itself in the other’s place.

Thus, even if the US does not welcome a peace agreement because of the interests of its defense industry, whereas it should be the supporter and subject of it, we have to diminish the tension between North and South and find our way to national reunification through peaceful coexistence. Accordingly, a second North-South summit has to resume as soon as possible and a peace declaration has to be made regardless of US objections. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea need to declare to the Korean people and to the whole world that they will respect each others authority and no longer continue their race for hegemonic power on the Korean peninsula.

As a concrete means to realize this ideal it is necessary to confer legal power according to international law to the Basic Agreement between North and South Korea of 1992. The Republic of Korea should seek ratification in the National Assembly, and North and South have to try to attain joint membership in the UN. Further, North and South both have to make the necessary changes to certain elements of their constitution which are remains of the Cold War era, and also revise laws based on these constitutions, such as the National Security Law in South Korea and the Chosun Labor Party regulations in North Korea.

We have to put the past behind us, a time when the residents of North and South were legally punished for uttering friendly remarks about each other, and instead create laws that regulate hostile expressions calling for the destruction of the other party. As one nation, the use of hostile expressions against each other is not just a matter of freedom of speech, but is a sinful act of self-destruction.

Although the replacement of the truce agreement with a peace agreement needs the consent of outside forces, it is by all means possible with the mere will of the two Koreas to declare peace on the peninsula, confer legal force to the Basic Agreement between North and South, and further change the legal environment in both North and South Korea to that of the post-Cold War order.

It is also imperative that each and every member of the Korean nation recognizes what is most important to the future of our nation. If the majority understands the importance of self-reliance and continues to persuade each government to fulfill its duties by engaging in civic movements I am certain that no outside force will be able to enforce this state of division or hostile arms race on us forever.
 

 

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