PSPD in English Archive 2002-01-31   2175

The Korean Peninsula before and after September 11

I. American Unilateralism

A South Korean poet who makes a living on the south side of the peninsula reflects on the repercussions of September 11 for the Korean peninsula. He writes:

I am horribly scared. I eagerly hoped that North Korea was not involved in the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11. I also feared that Korean soldiers would be dispatched when American fighter-bombers started to take off from the aircraft carrier. Even when the anthrax bacteria appeared in the U.S., I was deathly afraid of the thought of biological weapons being manufactured in Pyongyang.

His fear is founded on the firm belief that “it is the U.S. that decides on making war and peace on the Korean peninsula, yes, the U.S.”

Fortunately the South Korean poet’s fears were groundless. North Korea quickly and firmly denounced terrorism, relieving fears of many who worried about the North’s position. North Korean television quickly broadcast on September 12 that the unprecedented attack against the U.S. had resulted in a nationwide panic, followed by remarks from the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that September 11 not only shocked the international society, but also reminded North Koreans of the danger caused by terrorism. Furthermore, the spokesperson commented that North Korea, as a member of the United Nations, would not support terrorism and its position would remain firm on this matter. In fact, it has been reported that North Korea had secretly sent an anti-terrorist message to the American government.

But North Korea’s action of sending anti-terrorist comments was not so strange, considering its position in the international society. The American government has put North Korea on the list of terrorist states since 1987. In order to escape from it, North Korea has tried to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States since 1993. As a result, North Korea and the United States reached a Joint Communique on November 12, 2000 in which North Korea expressed its strong will to oppose any kind of terrorism. North Korea, being politically and economically sanctioned by the American government owing to its stigma would not want to be implicated in the events of September 11.

Therefore, the overriding tone was that September 11 would not have any negative repercussions on the Korean peninsula. It would be, however, a hasty conclusion. September 11 is much more important epoch-making incident than any other-it strongly indicates the world order in the new millennium. It also exerts a significant impact on American foreign policy in general and American policy towards the Korean peninsula in particular. It is a well-known fact that unilateralism in American foreign policy has been strengthened since the Bush administration. It is not yet clear whether September 11 will reinforce American unilateralism or restore multilateral cooperation in world politics. For the time being, American unilateralism will predominate as long as the American government continues to wage wars against such so-called ‘rogue states’ as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. It could be, therefore, highly possible for the American government to force North Korea to surrender, especially in light of the fact that the American government has totally reexamined its policy towards North Korea since the inauguration of the Bush administration. In other words, under the condition that the dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. was at a standstill, September 11 will strengthen American unilateralism on the Korean peninsula.

The talks between the two Koreas was also at a stalemate because of the suspension of the dialogue between North Korea and the U.S., although inter-Korean relations had improved in all aspects since the historical summit between the two Korean leaders on June 15, 2000. Furthermore, North Korea is extremely uneasy about the alert ordered by the South Korean government after September 11. North Korea has refused to hold further inter-Korean meetings in the South in defiance of the alert. Although the fifth inter-Korean Ministerial talks held in Seoul from September 15-18, 2001 reached an agreement on the exchange of dispersed family members and the reconnection of the railway from Seoul to Sineuju, their implementation will be postponed because of the alert. North Korea strongly insists that inter-Korean talks must be held in the North, like Keumkang Mountain. September 11 has had negative effects on the Korean peninsula in the short run. This paper analyses two axes, the relations between North Korea and the United States and inter-Korean relations before and after September 11, and then proposes feasible alternatives for peace on the Korean peninsula.

II. Before September 11

The Sunshine policy of the Kim Dae Jung government differs from prior South Korean policy towards North Korea of predecessor governments in that it does not oppose the idea that relations between North Korea and the United States takes precedence over inter-Korean relations. This policy is based on the proposition that the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula cannot be realized until North Korea is regarded as a normal state in international society. The Kim Dae Jung government has supported rapprochement between North Korea and the United States even when inter-Korean talks ceased. When. Cho Myong Rok, vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission, arguably a position of supreme power in North Korea, visited the United States on October 12, 2000, it seemed that the relations between the two nations entered a new stage. The Joint Communique to be published appeared to be as important as the South-North Joint Declaration on June 15, 2000.

The Communique needs to be summarized since it aptly reflects the pending problems between the two nations. In short, the Communique dealt with the following:

(1) Significance of the historical summit between the two Korean leaders

(2) Transition from an armistice agreement to a peace agreement between North Korea and the U.S.

(3) Economic cooperation between the two nations

(4) Suspension of proof firing of long-range missiles during the talks

(5) Denuclerization of the Korean peninsula and stability

(6) Cooperation in the field of humanitarianism

(7) Support for international anti-terrorist efforts

The Communique was a laudable achievement that was a culmination of eight years of talks. The two nations promised to reconcile with each other. Ms. Albright, Minister of the State Department paid a visit to Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, as according to the clause of the Communique. During her stay, Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader stated that North Korea would not deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles ranging over 500km, nor produce additional missiles. He also promised to accept the verification procedure under the stipulation that it would not be intrusive. Kim Jong Il officially invited President Clinton to Pyongyang. Unfortunately, President Clinton informed North Korea that he could not visit Pyongyang on December 2000 because of the controversy over the examination of the ballots in the presidential election and the instability in the Middle East. This period was the apogee of U.S.-North Korea relations.

In fact, the beginning of the dismantling of the cold war on the Korean Peninsula goes back to the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994. Ms. Albright’s visit to Pyongyang built a stronger foundation that could have signified the end of the cold war confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the start of friendly relations with the EU also cemented the hope that the cold war system would finally be dismantled. On November 2000 shortly after the Communique, the Council of the European Union publicized the actions of lines supporting the inter-Korean talks to ease the hostile tension embedded in the Korean peninsula, demanding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the ratification of CTBT, the suspension of export of missiles and their technology, and the respect for the UN human rights convention. This action of the European Union could also contribute to the dismantling of the cold war on the Korean peninsula. However, it appears as if the Bush administration is intentionally disregarding the established agreements and positive achievements of the past. In fact, the Bush administration has reverted its policy towards North Korea to the pre-Geneva-Agreed-Framework.

The Bush administration has made an attempt to differentiate its policy towards North Korea from that of the Clinton administration. L. Sigal, former reporter for New York Times and professor of Columbia University, has discovered a vicious cycle that includes a chain of actions of ignorance-anger-bargain-acceptance in the past administrations’ policy towards North Korea. In the beginning, the Clinton administration denied or ignored talks with the North, then became furious at the North’s noncompliance, and once again took initial steps to bargain with the North, became depressed but finally accepted the deal. Similarly, the Bush administration denies talks with North Korea, and also regards China not as strategic partner but as a strategic competitor.

As the Bush administration rejects negotiation and is angered by North Korea, North Korea adamantly replies that the proof firing of long-range missiles is “an independent right.” President Kim Dae Jung, after his visit with the newly-elect President Bush in the United States changed his opinion on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a strategic cornerstone of diplomacy, and wound up supporting the Missile Defense System launched by the Bush administration. Accordingly, inter-Korean relations have, to a great extent, deteriorated. It was reported that President Bush told President Kim Dae Jung that Kim Jung Il was not a credible leader. The Sunshine policy through which Kim Dae Jung government has been engaging the North and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula could not but be severely crippled due to its dependency on U.S. diplomacy.

The doves in the U.S. critique the Bush administration’s coercive diplomacy towards North Korea. For example, J. Rubin, former Assistant Deputy Minister of State Department, argued that it was not American diplomats but European diplomats that went to Pyongyang, met Kim Jung Il and reaffirmed the suspension of missile proof firing, tackling the threats of North Korea. He also criticized the Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea, arguing that the European Union actions made positive contributions in East Asia, a job that Americans should have assumed.

On May, 2001, C. Powell, Minister of the Department of State pronounced that the American government will resume talks with North Korea if the reexamination of American policy towards North Korea is fully completed, although this proposal presupposes the necessity of inspection and verification of North Korean nuclear facilities and missile program. Even President Bush who said that Kim Jung Il was not a credible communist leader pronounced that talks between North Korea and the United States will resume on June 2001. The American government has placed on the agenda: (1) nuclear inspection; (2) the verification of missile program; and (3) the reduction of threats of conventional armaments. The Bush administration added North Korean conventional armaments to the agenda, but the withdrawal from the list of terrorist states was not included in the agenda, a move that North Korea eagerly desired.

The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in North Korea, however, rebutted such a proposal and strongly demanded compensation for the delay in the KEDO project. Now, North Korea calls for the observance of the Communique of November 2000. Faced with such a strong opposition from the North, C. Powell came to propose that unconditional negotiation could be possible. But, the hawks within the Bush administration argued that North Korea was one of the most dangerous threats among the so-called rogue states. To the American government, in its attempt to construct the missile defense system, North Korea would be an easy target to legitimize it.

Finally, from the advent of the Bush administration to September 11, the Korean peninsula had experienced very dangerous instability in comparison with the situation under the Clinton administration. This situation was created by a new administration that overtly denied and refused to build on the established achievements made by the Clinton administration. North Korea has exchanged harsh language with the United States since the beginning of the Bush administration. The limit of the Kim Dae Jung government in dealing with the Bush administration created a stalemate in inter-Korean relations. Once again, it was reaffirmed that the relations between North Korea and the United States was the key axis in the politics of the Korean peninsula. September 11 contributes to the instability of the Korean peninsula when faced with an administration that does not give its confidence to the North and South Korean governments.

III. After September 11

When September 11 occurred, many people raised the following questions: (1) Who attacked the U.S.? (2) How would the U.S. respond to the attack? (3) What effects would the attack have on the world order? Although we do not have proof of who committed the terrorist attack, most people seem to think that the responsibility lies in one of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. To some, this is an extremely curious consensus. Why the Islamic fundamentalist?

In a society within which the rule of law works, a suspect is presumed to be innocent until he or she is given a verdict of guilty. This principle does not work in September 11. The American government started to wage war against Afghanistan into which the suspect, Osama bin Laden, is presumed to be hiding himself. It is very difficult to interpret this military operation as an invocation of self-defense. Even after the American government has overthrown the Taliban regime supporting Osama bin Laden, it proclaimed that the anti-terrorist war would be continued. A new world order after September 11 is in a maze.

September 11 created tremendous fear in Americans. It may be the first time for the U.S. mainland to be a target for a terrorist attack that assumed military operations aside from the attack from the British Army during the Revolutionary War. Unfortunately, many other nations have faced or been hit hard by the “militaristic diplomacy”of the United States. Ordinary Americans are probably blissfully ignorant of the fact that the American army has bombed or attacked (or both) the following states and others since 1945: China, Korea, Guatemala, Indonesia, Cuba, Peru, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Granada, Libya, El Salvador, Panama, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia. The average American citizen cannot be aware that the Stars and Stripes continued to be burned almost daily around the world, in part due to the terrorist-like actions of the U.S. government. Can they understand how much the Islamic people are furious at the U.S.? Can they understand that Iran has transformed the former American embassy into a museum of arrogance? Do they know that Osama bin Laden was raised by the CIA in the age of the cold war? Do they know that the American government described the Pakistani leader as a dictator before September 11 and then calls him a guardian for democracy after September 11?

As one critic points out, September 11 has given American people a new opportunity to discover ‘their’ world, which is fundamentally different from the American world. It seems that the discovery does not lead to the toleration of cultural differences. But Noam Chomsky, an exceptional American scholar, defines the Afghan war in which the U.S. acted like a rogue state as a worse crime than the terrorist attack itself. Ordinary Americans may understand the war as a means to defend the American way of life or the American type of justice, and for them, Islam symbolizes an antithesis of all they hold as right and just. Mainstream Americans have decided that Islamic civilization is fanatic, ignorant, and a failure.

Mainstream scholars in the U.S. provide a more sophisticated explanation of the Islamic civilization. S. Huntington argues that the emerging world order after the cold war will come to a ‘clash of civilizations.’ This provocative and prophetic argument, in fact, presupposes a universal civilization that should be followed by others. If it is argued that a civilization is universal in spite of the fact that various civilizations co-exist, then there can only exist sub-civilizations or competing civilizations must vanish in the world of civilizations. This discourse is as good as refined imperialist discourse. While Huntington argues that the anti-terrorist wars are not the clash of civilizations, this discourse only sounds like a conspiracy of creating a fictious enemy in a post-cold war era. F. Fukuyama, another mainstream scholar, who elucidates the end of history implying the final victory of liberal democracy and market economy, argues that the conflicts across the globe is caused by those nations who are against modernization, that is to say, westernization. This discourse may be fundamentally different from that of Huntington, in that it pays attention to the convergence of various civilizations. But the two discourses share the idea of the Islamic civilization as the new enemy or threat against American civilization or American hegemony.

Both Huntington and Fukuyama play on the theoretical sophistication of a new international political reality in which the United States as a genuine empire and lonely superpower enjoys a ‘unipolar moment’. And the foreign policy of the Bush administration is locked in this unipolar moment. Although the Clinton administration also enjoyed the moment, it did not disregard multilateral cooperation with other nations like Bush has been doing. He has exerted unilateral policy against other nations from the start of his presidency as seen in the withdrawal from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Kyoto Climatic Change Convention. Undoubtedly, he and his administration will, therefore, recognize September 11 as a challenge against American unilateralism. This unilateral foreign policy threatens to destroy the established norms of cooperation at the international level. A critical question is raised: Can the American government show us a political imagination that translates September 11, a challenge against unipolar hegemony, into an opportunity for international cooperation?

Who and how can political imagination be injected into the American government? The imagination has not entered the Korean peninsula yet. The Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea has been propelled by a hatred against a communist dictatorship, the differentiation of foreign policy from the former administration and the utility of the North Korean missile program for the construction of a missile defense system. The key components of the Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea have not changed after September 11. President Bush told Yonhap News, a Korean new agency on October 2001 that North Korea was denying talks with the United States. In addition, his prejudice against North Korean leader, Kim Jung Il, has not altered.

North Korea resolutely argued in a leading article of Rodong Shimun, a party organ, that the Bush administration should at least observe the joint Communique of October if it wanted to resume talks. North Korea, in pointed disdain, titled the article, “We Impeach Bush’s Wicked Slander,?as a rebuttal to the denunciation of Kim Jong Il. Irrespective of the little jabs of contempt, North Korea’s anti-terrorist stance also indicates that the North will not give up talks with the United States. In particular, North Korea is emphasizing the necessity of noninterference in domestic affairs, as the American government proclaims infinite war against terrorism. A North Korean delegation working for the Institute for Disarmament and Peace reaffirmed his anti-terrorist position very clearly at a conference held in ‘Washington’ on 30 October 2001. However, he stated that a joint declaration of North and South Korea against terrorism is not desirable since the United States continues to have North Korea listed as a terrorist state. North Korea also joined international conventions against terrorism on November 2001.

North Korea has engaged in a harsh verbal battle with the United States since the events of September 11. In fact, the verbose battle between them is one means for both parties to maintain their prestige. Both do not make concessions. It seems that North Korea’s push to resume talks under the framework of the joint Communique of October 2000 is right. But international politics tends to be struggle for power, as realists argue. The Bush administration follows the realist tradition in making foreign policy. Now, power politics precedes consensual politics in U.S.-North Korea relations. Who can change this stalemate?

IV. September 11 and its Aftermath

September 11 has demanded the Bush administration to reprioritize its policy, relegating North Korea as a less significant matter. In other words, the American government could be no longer interested in North Korea, above all because it too busy engaging in an all-consuming “battle” against the Islamic civilization. Accordingly, North Korea can be impatient over the relative indifference that has been shown by the American government. North Korea seems to feel uneasy about the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM on December 2001, in particular since North Korea could be a target for the construction of the MD system. North Korea has indeed exposed her nervous anxiety in Rodong Shimun on 9 December 2001, arguing that North Korea could be the next target for the anti-terrorist wars by the American government. In the published article, the United States was even given the title of the ‘boss of terrorism.’ September 11 seems to have strengthened the hawks who prefer unilateral foreign policy. One of the most important variables to affect the relations between North Korea and the U.S. is domestic politics in the U.S. If the American government continues to exert one type of coercive diplomacy or another towards North Korea, tension will remain high on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the “Perry Process” by which North Korea and the U.S. had improved their relationship step by step on the basis of the principle of mutual threat reduction and the peace process started by the inter-Korean summit could be reversed. North and South Korea have faced a big obstacle.

The U.S. demands a capitulation from North Korea, which could signify the collapse of the North Korean regime. In particular, this compulsion of the United States could seriously threaten the North Korean economy. To make matters worse, the KEDO project, originally planned for completion by 2003 could be postponed to 2007 or 2009 or canceled all together. The delay could have a negative effect on North Korean economy already suffering from a serious shortage of electric energy. When North Korea pronounced that it would suspend the proof firing of long-range missile by 2003, she had the KEDO project in mind as a trade for its compliance. If the American government were to postpone or cancel the KEDO project on the pretext of a refusal of nuclear inspection and verification of the missile program by North Korea, tensions will definitely run dangerously high on the Korean peninsula.

Now, it seems that North Korea has a few choices. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will accelerate the spread of capitalist economy in China. Accordingly, North Korea’s dependence on Chinese economy would not be an easy choice since its link to China will also invariably tie the North to the rest of the capitalist world economy. North Korea could accept the agenda raised by the American government and begin talks with the U.S. or relinquish the improvement in the relations between North Korea and the United States. Or the North could choose unpredictable brinkmanship tactics against the U.S., as in the past. North Korea’s policy choice, in fact, is contingent upon the American attitude towards North Korea. Actually, the American government will not want its influence to be decreased in the East Asian region. It would lead to the disintegration of the strategic balance in East Asia because North Korea’s hard choice would make the U.S. edgy and extremely uneasy. At the same time, the U.S. would not want China to exert a monopolistic influence on North Korea. Therefore, the only option for the United States is to engage North Korea in the long run. Nevertheless, an unpredictable crisis could arise on the Korean Peninsula, if incessant efforts were not made to mitigate potential confrontations among nations in the East Asian region.

South Korea can play a decisive role in conciliating the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. Had the inter-Korean summit of July 2000 not been held, an air strike could be made against North Korea, because the American government still regards North Korea as a rogue state. Currently, political and economic exchange between the North and the South has resumed in spite of the alert in the South. A North Korean observation group visited South Korea for the first time after September 11 to see the nuclear power plant being generated by a light-water reactor. It can be considered a trivial visit. But even if this is a tiny change, we can identify what North Korea wants now through this visit. North Korea would have to know that American bureaucrats have commented on possible delays of the KEDO project, or a substitution of the KEDO for thermal power plants unless North Korea complied with the suggestions raised by the NPT. Therefore, the visit can have important implications considering the present conditions on the Korean peninsula created by September 11. In order to avoid a ‘clash of ignorances’ on the Korean peninsula, various mediators should play positive roles.

President Bush will officially visit South Korea, Japan, and China on February 2002. As already known, this visit is to rearrange the American foreign policy giving primacy towards East Asia. The Bush administration will try to check China, tame North Korea and strengthen its alliance with Japan. It is reported that the stability of the Korean peninsula is one of the most important agenda. But it is not clear what this stability indicates. It could indicate a stability where the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. continues. Also, President Bush could demand that South Korea should buy American weapons such as F-X, AH-X, SAM-X, FDX-III and so on, exaggerating the threat of conventional weapons of North Korea. If the South Korean government decides to buy the weapons amounting to ten trillions, inter-Korean relations can meet a serious crisis. The South Korean government should have a good command of an elastic diplomacy towards the U.S.

The South Korean government has to pay attention to the fact that the dialogue between North Korea and the European Union continues, although North Korea-U.S. relations are at a stalemate. The European Union’s “constructive engagement policy” towards North Korea will have a positive effect on the position of North Korea in the international society. Moreover, because the European Union is also a member of the KEDO Executive Board, the future of the KEDO project cannot be unilaterally decided by the American government. The European Union, considering the non-proliferation of nuclear power at the international level, has a vital interest in maintaining the KEDO. The European Union can play an important role in preventing North Korea from buying electric power while selling missiles, as well. The European Union also applies the concept of “comprehensive security” to North Korea, which is defined as the amalgamation of political and military issues, economic cooperation and human rights. Now, the European Union talks about the human rights situation with North Korea. The South Korean government should wisely make full use of the constructive engagement policy of the European Union in creating and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The constructive engagement policy of the European Union could be ineffective if the South Korean government takes part in the Missiles Defense System proposed by the United States and were to buy a large quantity of American weapons. A new cold war could emerge in the East Asian region. It is the elastic diplomacy that tells the United States international norms on the ABM Treaty and the Missile Defense System. Paradoxically, September 11 could provide a space for the practices of such norms that can oppose the Missile Defense System. After September 11, it cannot be denied that a consensus is gradually spread in international society that the co-existence of various cultures is one of the most important conditions for the desirable future of mankind. The South Korean government should make proper use of anti-American sentiment in the part of South Korean civil society as a source of the elastic foreign policy towards the U.S. while tolerating the differences within South Korea. It is time to radically rethink the future of the Korean peninsula.

Koo Kabwoo (Professor, School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University)

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