다음은 크리스토퍼 힐 미 국무부 동아태 차관보가 지난 6일 미 하원 청문회에서 발표한 글을 간략하게 요약한 것이다.
“6자 회담과 북핵문제”
6자회담 결과는 분명하다. 북한이 모든 핵무기와 현존하는 핵프로그램을 포기하고 조속한 시일 내 NPT와 IAEA 안전조치에 복귀하는 것이다. 9. 19 공동성명은 북한이 신속히, 검증가능하도록 비핵화를 이루도록 하는 것이며, 다른 참가국들은 인권문제와 같은 문제가 논의된다면 경제협력과 에너지 지원 그리고 관계 정상화를 위한 단계조치를 취하도록 하는 것이다.
나는 어떤 참가국도 공동성명에 완전히 만족했을 것이라고 생각하지 않는다. 공동성명은 모든 참가국들이 향후 협상해야 할 문제들에 대한 합의문서라고 할 수 있다.
북한의 향후 민수용 핵이용 권리에 대해 많은 논의들이 있었다. 공동성명에서 북한은 핵에너지를 평화적으로 이용할 권리가 있다고 주장하였다. 다른 참가국들은 이러한 주장에 대해 적절한 시점에 북한에 경수로를 제공하는 문제에 대해 논의하기로 합의하였다.
미국은 북한에게 경수로를 제공할 적절한 시점에 대해 분명하게 입장을 밝혔다. 미국은 북한이 조속히 핵무기와 핵B프로그램을 제거하고 이것이 IAEA 등 신뢰할만한 국제기구를 통해 모든 참가국들이 만족할정도로 검증되었을 때, 그리고 북한이 NPT와 IAEA 안전조치를 완전히 준수하고 이에 대한 협력과 투명성을 지속적으로 보여주며 핵기술 확산을 중단했을 때에만 경수로 제공논의를 지지할 것이다.
한국과 일본, 러시아 그리고 중국 대표단은 이 문제에 대해서 입장을 밝혔다. 각국은 북한과의 어떠한 에너지 협력도 북한이 NPT와 IAEA 안전조치에 대한 권리와 의무를 다하는 것에 따라 이루어질 것이라고 하였다. 북한의 에너지 수요는 다른 수단을 통해서 공급될 수 있다고 이해하고 그 어떤 국가도 북한에게 경수로를 제공할 의사를 밝히지 않았다. 9월 20일 북한 외무성의 주장은 공동성명과 모순되는 것이다. 나는 참가국 중 어떤 나라도 북한에게 경수로를 제공할 의사를 밝히지 않았음을 다시 밝혀둔다.
나는 베이징에서 종결성명을 발표하면서 미국은 올해 말까지 KEDO와 경수로 건설을 폐기해야 한다는 결정에 지지한다고 밝혔다. 우리는 KEDO가 그 목적을 다하였으며, 이제 비핵화를 달성하기 위해 새롭고 보다 안전한 해결책이 필요하다고 본다.
공동성명은 비핵화 맥락에서 미국과 북한이 양자의 정책에 따라 양자관계를 정상화하는 조치를 취할 것임을 밝혔다. 나는 종결성명에서 미국의 오래된 우려사항이 해결되는 것에 따라 관계를 정상화하기를 바란다고 분명히 밝혔다. 이것은 정상화로 가는 과정에서 필수적으로 인권과 생화학문기, 탄도미사일, 재래식 무기 확산, 테러리즘과 그 밖의 불법행위 등을 논의해야 한다는 것을 의미한다. 북한이 국제사회에 복귀하기를 희망한다면 국제적 기준을 준수하고 그것을 지킬 의지를 증명해야 할 것이다.
공동성명의 핵심적인 약속들을 이행하기 위해 우리는 북한의 확산 및 불법활동을 저지하기 위한 조치들을 계속 취해 나갈 것이다. 우리는 최근 대량살상무기확산방지구상(PSI)을 강화하고 있고, 북한의 재래식 무기 판매문제에 대해 핵심 파트너 국가들과 논의하고 있으며, 북한이 돈세탁에 이용한 마카오에 있는 은행에 대해 애국자법 311조에 따라 조치를 취한 바 있다.
베이징 공동성명이 다루고 있는 문제들은 복잡하고 상호 연관되어 있으며, 협상은 어려울 것이다. 그러나 나는 참가국들이 지난 9.19 성명에 담은 비전을 실현하는 것이 그들의 근본적 이익에 부합한다는 것을 인식하고 있을 것으로 믿는다.
참고: 9.19 6자회담 공동성명에 대한 미국 측 입장(비공개 연설문)
(원문)
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement of Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill
“The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Issue”
October 6, 2005
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to review with the Committee the important results from the Six-Party Talks in Beijing two weeks ago, and the way forward. Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, U.S. Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks, is appearing with me today, and while Ambassador DeTrani does not have a statement, he will be happy to respond to questions from the Committee.
The key outcome of the last round of Six-Party talks is clear, unambiguous, and endorsed by all Six Parties to the talks: It is the DPRK commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.
The September 19 Joint Statement is a statement of principles designed to guide the parties on the way forward. It gives a vision of the end-point of the process – from the DPRK, prompt and verifiable denuclearization; from the other parties, economic cooperation, energy assistance, and steps toward normalization of relations, provided that matters of bilateral concern such as human rights are addressed.
The DPRK’s agreement to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs is a critical step toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and toward a more stable and secure Northeast Asia. The next phase, working out the details of the DPRK’s denuclearization as well as corresponding measures the other parties will take, will involve tough negotiations. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons and programs threaten peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region and beyond, as well as global nonproliferation regime. We believe that the Six-Party Talks are the best means of dealing with this threat. We are beginning to see results. But the time has come to move from declarations to real action. The parties agreed to hold the fifth round of Talks in Beijing in November, where the next step is to discuss a process and timetable for denuclearization.
In my remarks today, Mr. Chairman, I’ll give a sense of the dynamic of the talks earlier this month in Beijing, elaborate on the elements of the agreement reached, and sketch out where we will go from here.
The Beijing Talks
We held intensive discussions July 26 through August 7, recessing so delegations could consult with capitals and reconvening September 13 through 19. The six parties met together in plenary or smaller session most days, sometimes multiple times a day. We met with our allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea, daily. We met nearly every day with the Chinese delegation and the DPRK delegation, and most days as well with the Russian delegation.
All the delegations were serious and well-prepared, and the atmosphere was business-like. There was very little in the way of polemics. Discussions were to the point and focused on getting agreement on a package of elements for a joint statement that would bring us to the implementation phase.
I want to make special note of the important role China played in this round of Talks. China was a full participant. It also chaired the Talks. It pursued its national interests, but the Chinese delegation also acted as a kind of Secretariat, extracting from the positions put forward by all the parties elements that could be combined to form the basis of a joint statement. China circulated five drafts of the joint agreement during the fourth round, and I must say the Chinese drafting was deft. I don’t think any of the parties were completely satisfied with the final product; that is the way with consensus documents, on which all parties have to make compromises. Still, the document allows us to get to the implementation phase as quickly as possible, and to move closer to the goal of denuclearization.
Elements of the Joint Statement
I’ll now discuss the specific text of the Joint Statement.
For the first time, the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The new DPRK commitment is broader in scope than was the case under the Agreed Framework, under which the DPRK agreed to cease a series of defined nuclear activities at specific facilities. While North Korea did freeze its graphite-moderated reactor programs, it subsequently violated the Agreed Framework and the 1992 inter-Korean joint declaration on denuclearizing the Peninsula by pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program. Although the DPRK’s new pledge to dismantle is unambiguous, the proof of its intent will of course be in the nature of its declaration of nuclear weapons and programs, and then in the speed with which it abandons them.
In my closing statement at the talks, Mr. Chairman, I specified that the DPRK must comprehensively declare, and then completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminate, all elements of its past and present nuclear programs – plutonium and uranium – and all of its nuclear weapons, and not reconstitute those programs in the future. I made clear that to return to the NPT and come into full compliance with IAEA safeguards, the DPRK would, among other things, need to cooperate on all steps deemed necessary to verify the correctness and completeness of its declarations of nuclear materials and activities. My counterparts from all the other parties to the Six-Party Talks stipulated in their own closing remarks that the signal achievement of the fourth round was the DPRK’s commitment to undertake full denuclearization. All my counterparts stressed that it was incumbent on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear status, return to the NPT and abide by IAEA safeguards.
There has been much comment on the DPRK’s future right to a civilian nuclear program. The DPRK, in the Joint Statement, asserted that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties took note of this assertion and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK.
We have been crystal clear with respect to when the “appropriate time” would be to discuss with the DPRK provision of a light water reactor. The U.S. will only support such a discussion:
— after the DPRK had promptly eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs, and this had been verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means, including the IAEA; and
— after the DPRK had come into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, had demonstrated a sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency, and had ceased proliferating nuclear technology.
The Korean, Japanese, Russian and Chinese delegations made statements in this regard, each specifying that they would handle any energy cooperation with DPRK in strict accordance with rights and obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards. None of them expressed a willingness to provide the DPRK with an LWR, understanding that the DPRK’s legitimate energy needs are best met through other means. The DPRK Foreign Ministry, in a September 20 press statement, said the DPRK would return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards only after it received a light water reactor from the United States. The September 20 assertion is inconsistent with the language in the Joint Statement and at odds with statements made by all of the other parties. Subsequent DPRK comments appear to modify the September 20 demand, but do not provide the clarity that we need. I will note again that none of the other parties expressed a willingness to provide the DPRK with an LWR.
In my closing statement in Beijing, I noted that the NPT recognized that Treaty parties could pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Foremost among the Treaty’s obligations for all but the five nuclear-weapons states is the commitment not to possess or pursue nuclear weapons. The Treaty also calls for its parties to adhere to safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Thus, the DPRK’s statement concerning its “right” to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be premised on the verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well as the nation’s coming into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
I also noted in my statement that the United States supported a decision by the end of this year to terminate KEDO and its light-water reactor project. We believe that KEDO as an organization has served its purpose and that now we need new, more secure, arrangements to carry out denuclearization.
As the DPRK takes steps to denuclearize, the other parties have agreed to a number of corresponding measures. In the Joint Statement, the U.S. affirmed that we have no nuclear weapons on the territory of the ROK and that we have no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. But we do continue to worry about the large conventional forces the DPRK maintains. Let me underscore that the U.S. remains committed to our alliance with the ROK, and has no plan to withdraw additional troops from the Peninsula.
The Joint Statement specifies in the context of denuclearization, the U.S. and the DPRK will take steps to normalize bilateral relations, subject to bilateral policies. In my statement, I made clear the United States desires to normalize relations subject to resolution of our longstanding concerns. By this I meant that as a necessary part of the process leading to normalization, we must discuss important issues including human rights, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missile programs, proliferation of conventional weapons, terrorism and other illicit activities. I left no doubt that if the DPRK wished to return to the international community, it would have to commit to international standards across the board, and then prove its intentions.
In the Joint Statement, the U.S. and its partners agreed to identify means of addressing the DPRK’s energy needs. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK. The proposal provides an expedited and non-nuclear solution to the DPRK’s urgent need for energy, opening the way for economic modernization and development. The United States is considering how it might participate in provision of energy assistance. We are also thinking about how we might assist with retraining the DPRK’s nuclear scientists and workers.
Throughout the talks we appreciated the close cooperation and steadfast support of our Japanese and ROK allies. Our trilateral consultations allowed us to achieve progress. We were pleased to see that the GOJ and DPRK in the Joint Statement said that they would undertake to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of settlement of the unfortunate past and outstanding issues of concern. Japan’s delegate, in his closing statement, made clear that those issues included missiles and abductions; the U.S. supports this position.
When implemented, the total package of the undertakings in the Joint Statement will advance the U.S. national interest by denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. The package is aimed at eliciting North Korean actions that will enhance the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. If implemented, it will provide new opportunities for growth and stability in East Asia, and a new and better future for the North Korean people.
Next Steps
The parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November. We are preparing for those meetings now. The next step will be to have discussions on key elements of the Joint Statement, especially regarding DPRK actions to declare and dismantle its nuclear weapons program, and actions that the international community will take to verify that dismantlement. We will also begin to consider economic cooperation, energy assistance and a normalization process. We will be drawing up time-lines and sequencing of actions. Through diplomatic channels, we are in touch with the other parties.
As we implement key elements of the Joint Statement, we will continue to take steps to protect ourselves and our allies from North Korea’s proliferation and illicit activities. We have recently strengthened the Proliferation Security Initiative, consulted with key partners on DPRK conventional arms sales, and taken action under Section 311 of the Patriot Act against a bank in Macau used by the North Koreans for money laundering.
The way forward is to build on the agreement that we reached last month in Beijing. The issues are complex and interrelated, and negotiations will be difficult. But I believe that each of the parties recognizes that the realization of the vision laid out in the September 19 Joint Statement is in its fundamental interest. This provides a firm basis on which to proceed. We will continue to work closely with the Committee as we do so.
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