평화군축센터 미분류 2010-09-15   842

PSPD Statement on the Final Government Report on the Sunken Cheonan Warship


Still Suspicious: The Final Gov. Report on Cheonan Warship, Time for the National Assembly to take a Verification Measure
 
The Ministry of National Defense released its final report on Cheonan Warship on 13 September. It was released after two and a half month since the Ministry of National Defense’s commitment of disclosure. However, the release was delayed about one and half month from the originally promised release date. At any rate National Defense Ministry of Republic of Korea finally disclosed a 289-page final report, in which about forty pages were added to the former one on May 20. It has been six months since the sink of the Cheonan Warship.


The problem, however, is that few reasonable and logical answers were made throughout the final report for the questions raised by the public, the National Assembly and overseas experts.


At last, the report disclosed to diplomatic corps in Korea three months ago was disclosed to the public and the National Assembly


In terms of levels and qualities of the disclosed information, the 289-page final report on Cheonan warship does not contain either advanced or new important information compared to the previous one.


Firstly, the depth of the sea between the wakes, which is the most fundamental and critical information, is not disclosed.


Secondly, the reliable communication records are not disclosed to determine the situation, instead only several examples are selectively chosen and summarized. 


Thirdly, it is true that testimonies of the survivals and sentries include critical information, but they were already reluctantly disclosed by the Ministry of National Defense after the efforts of the National Assembly members, such as Mun Sun Choi. The testimonies are being falsely used and distorted to support the existence of water pillar although contents of them actually do not back up the conclusion of the government at all.


Fourthly, even though the roles of the foreign exports in the investigation are more precisely explained than before, it is not still disclosed whether they participated in finding so called ‘critical proof’, insisted by the Ministry of National Defense, or verifying its scientific feasibility. More precisely speaking, the final report indirectly reveals that the foreign experts barely participated in investigation or analysis of blueprint of the North Korean torpedo, “ 1번” written in Korean(meaning No. 1) mark on the torpedo propellant, oxide and bullet marks and etc. Moreover, the Swedish investigation group stipulates that they only agree on part of report which they participated in.


Fifthly; one other significant information is not precisely disclosed yet; the origin of North Korean torpedo blueprint and catalog; and information on the North Korean “Yeono” class submarine such as its capacity, materials, course and etc, which has been accused of attacking the Cheonan warship. However previously disclosed information is disappeared without proper explanations.


Sixthly, the Ministry goes into details regarding the results of simulation of the split course of the Cheonan warship in this final report. However, this simulation is designed by assuming or adjusting the amount of ammunition with the premise of torpedo attack. Therefore, it can hardly avoid the criticism that the government deliberately manipulates information according to the hypothesis.



Crucial information is still in veil, keeping silence on critical points


In terms of the content of the final report, the overall structure and main points are changed from the previous report on May 20. Although both reports conclude the same point, the final report announced on 13 Sep focuses on introducing the simulation in which a torpedo attack is presupposed, while ‘the final results’ announced on May 20 put stress on so called ‘critical proofs and its scientific analysis results’ in order to prove the conclusion of ‘being sunk by heavy torpedo attack launched by North Korean submarine’.


In the final report, the Ministry of National Defense briefly mentions about the torpedo propellant, which has been insisted as ‘critical proof’, in the last part of the report. Moreover, it does not deal with the ingredients of Aluminum oxide and results of its own experiment for verification in the main part of the report, but just appended. These raise suspicion on whether the signatures of the foreign investigation groups in the beginning of the report guarantee the context of the appendix or not.


In addition to this situation, the Ministry of National Defense ridicules and denounces the scientists who raised scientifically opposing ideas by using cartoon on the Cheonan warship incident. It is obviously overuse of government authority and an oppression of the freedom of expression.



Debatable analysis of the adsorbed material on the torpedo propellant, furtively moved to the appendix


JIG(Joint Investigation Group, the official name of the government investigation team)’s final analysis on the torpedo propellant is very disappointing in its context.


JIG is making a complex explanation based on outside expert, Prof. Song Tae-ho’s opinion in order to justify its analysis that Solvent Blue of ‘1번 marking ink’ could endure high temperature bubbles. However, it rather produces a logical contradiction since it denies its own analysis that a large amount of amorphous aluminum oxide(AI203) is attached on the screw of the torpedo propellant. That is to say aluminum contained in the ammunition should be liquefied by at least 2325.1 ℃ in order to be adsorbed on the front and the rear part of the torpedo screw as ‘AI 203’ according to the final report.


Moreover, JIG addresses that the diameter of the bubble made by the torpedo attack is about 6m high and insists that torpedo propellant which originally located at the end of 7.3-meter torpedo should move to the 30-40 meter rear. All of these make its explanation to be less reliable.


It requires a rapid separation in which not only heat but also adsorbed materials can not be delivered for the letter written by ink on the screw of separated torpedo propellant to remain. On the other hand, if the adsorbed materials exist, the ink should be burned with the heat delivered together. This logical contradiction was already addressed by PSPD’s report on its visiting the Ministry of National Defense regarding the Cheonan warship in July.


JIG of the Ministry of National Defense seems to recognize the questions raised by PSPD and others on the explosion by aluminum oxide rather than ammunition trace. In consequence, it spends many pages in the final report on analysis of ammunition, but it fails to draw meaningful conclusion. The JIG found a minute amount of unidentifiable ingredient of ammunition whether they are ours or North Korean Army’s, but any meaningful trace on the torpedo propellant was not found.



The Bent screw cannot be an evidence for death/damage by an underwater explosion


The final report, based on the premise of a torpedo attack, shows its limitation on proving impact and pressure of a torpedo attack to Cheonan warship.


Firstly, there is no feasible scientific explanation on right-bent screw of the torpedo. JIG explains it as the result of inertial force. However, it can not explain several points; why the left screw was not damaged; why the screws were rotating slowly at 100 times per minute at that time; and why barnacles on the right screw were worn off? It should be noted that the Russia investigation team has once concluded this change as trace of a grounded ship.


In addition, JIG suggests the changed pressure adjusting device of the vessel as a typical evidence for a trace of bubble’s pressure. However, it still seems to be insufficient to prove a torpedo attack. According to Navy veterans, pressure adjusting device of the vessel tend to be bent inward because it is a part exposed mostly to water pressure during sailing. So, old vessels tend to show similar phenomenon revealed on the Cheonan warship’s pressure adjusting device.


Finally, there are still remaining suspicions that most of the death was caused by drowning, while injuries of the survivals were generally light, and fluorescent lights and ammunitions inside the vessel were found in a fine condition.



Missing satellite photo of a “Yeono” class submarine and debate on its existence


The government has kept insisting that the Cheonan warship should be torpedoed and sunk by a North Korean “Yeono” class submarine. But in the final report a “Yeono” class submarine is not mentioned at all, which also causes controversy.



Since the National Defense White Paper 2004, the Ministry of National Defense had announced that North Korea had total 70 submarines including 60 Romeo classes and 10 Yugo and smaller classes. However, on 20 May, the Ministry of National Defense suddenly announced that North Korea has ten small submarines including “Yeono” class which has a new heavy torpedo capacity.


However, the chief of the JIG Information Analysis Team did not even know whether the name of submarine is “Yeono” or “Yono” in the Jane’s Defense and Security Yearbook; whether it is registered as a North Korean product or Iranian one; and whether its width is 2.75m or 3.5m or 3.2m. However, he insisted that he himself identified North Korean’s new submarine and named it as ‘Yeono’ in Korean. He also presented satellite photos of submarines of North Korea, insisting the photos seemed to be “Yeono” class submarine.


Moreover, the final report could not confirm whether North Korean small submarine left its navy base on that day. However the final report just briefly mentions that it confirms North Korean submarines’s leaving through ‘secret resource’ without further explanation. North Korean submarine’s leaving may be confirmed through some routes, but it can not be an exclusive evidence of attack on Cheonan vessel.


Moreover, the former U.S. ambassador Mr. Donald Gregg, a specialist of the Korean peninsula, made a negative assessment on the Korean government’s analysis that North Korea possesses a new type of torpedo enabling underwater explosion in his contribution to the New York Times, citing Russia’s report.



Final report threading information and analysis based on policy and hypothesis


Generally, the final report does not take further steps from the previous report on 20 May. Some of the analyses seem to reverse previous explanations or just to lessen the meanings.


Since the disclosure of investigation, four months ago a number of questions have been raised regarding the Cheonan warship. Citizen groups, including PSPD, were looking forward to the final report on Cheonan warship, expecting it can answer all the questions in a responsible manner. However, the final report of the Ministry of National Defense does not satisfy the citizens’ demand.


According to the survey by the Unification and Peace Institute of Seoul National University on 7 Sep, 2010, only 32% of Korean citizens trust the report of May 20 of the JIG. It means that seven out of ten people distrust the result. Unfortunately, the peoples’ trust seems to decline despite the comprehensive final report was disclosed.



Inspection and verification by National Assembly is critical


Now it is a turn for the National Assembly. The Ministry of National Defense does not clear out the Cheonan warship related suspicions, Thus, the National Assembly should take action on behalf of Korean people. The National Assembly finally became able to access to comprehensive results of analysis on the Cheonan warship, to which diplomatic corps and overseas journalists had accessed six months before. But there are still many remaining questions.


Opposition parties and PSPD have been strongly insisting investigation and verification by the National Assembly. There is no other method since the final report of the Ministry of National Defense does not clear out the questions. Once again, PSPD demand the National Assembly should take inspection on the Cheonan Warship.


Along with the investigation and verification, the National Assembly should take a comprehensive assessment on the following points; whether the issue was manipulated for political purpose; whether it was addressed to the international society without consent of people and approval of the National Assembly. If so, it became an object of consuming face-off diplomacy; And consequently social and diplomatic costs of this are being passed to citizen.

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