모호성에 직면하다; 북핵문제 어떻게 다룰것인가(Phillip Saunders, 2003, 3)

모호성에 직면하다; 북핵문제 어떻게 다룰것인가(Phillip Saunders, 2003, 3)

출처: 무기통제협회(Arms Control Association)

북한 문제를 다루는데 있어 가장 어려운 점은 핵 프로그램에 대한 그들의 진의를 파악하기 어렵다는데 있다. 북한 지도부는 핵무기를 정권의 생존을 위한 필수불가결한 요소로 판단하고 있는가, 아니면 협상에서 유리한 위치를 차지하기 위한 수단으로 여기고 있는가? 이 질문에 대한 답은 그리 간단하지 않다.

그 이유 중 하나는, 결정과정에 영향을 미치는 북한 정권 내부의 역학관계에 대한 신뢰할 만한 자료가 희박하다는 것이고, 다른 하나는 북한 지도부의 입장에서 볼 때, 자신들의 협상력을 극대화하고 북핵에 대한 국제사회의 비난을 최소화하기 위해서는 그 진의를 감추는 것이 훨씬 유리하기 때문이다.

이러한 사실은 1993-4년 북핵위기에서도 잘 나타난다. 1994년 당시, 영변 폭격 직전 상황까지 갔던 미국이 마지막 순간 폭격을 철회하고 북한과의 협상에 응했다. 협상의 결과로서 1994년 제네바 합의가 이루어졌고, 이 합의는 북한의 플라토니움 생산을 중단시킬 수 있었다. 하지만 그러한 와중에서도 북한은 핵무기 생산에 필요한 충분한 양의 플라토니움을 보유하고 있는지에 대해서는 대답하지 않았다. 즉, 북측은 협상력을 가능한 한 높이기 위해 핵무기 개발 정도에 대해서는 명확한 답을 주지 않은 것이다. 만약 핵사찰을 통해 북한이 충분한 양의 플라토니움을 보유하고 있지 않음이 드러났다면 평양은 협상의 주도권을 잃을 것이고, 미국은 북한 문제를 덜 심각하게 다뤘을 것이기 때문이다. 반대로 북한이 이미 충분한 양의 플라토니움을 가지고 있다고 판명되면 미국은 협상에 응하지 않을 것임이 자명했다.

명확하지 않은 북한의 핵 프로그램 개발 의도와 개발 정도를 놓고 네 가지 시나리오를 상정해 볼 수 있다.

1) 북한 지도부가 핵무기를 안보 보장을 위한 필수적 요소라고 판단한 경우이다

이 시나리오는 북한 지도부가 미국의 우월한 군사력과 정권 교체, 선제공격 운운하는 미국에 의해 위협을 느끼는 때 고려될 수 있다. 북한은 미국의 잠재적인 핵 위협에 맞서 그들 체제의 생존을 보장받는 길은 오직 핵무기 개발이라고 결론지었을지 모른다. (이 시나리오는 1990년 중후반에 북한이 1-2개의 핵무기를 생산했을 것이라는 미국 정보기관의 평가와 일치한다.) 만약 이 케이스가 맞는다면, 북핵문제의 평화적인 해결은 있을 수 없고 북한 지도부가 생각을 바꾸지 않는 한 핵 프로그램을 중단시킬 수 있는 방법도 없다. 그리하여 미국, 남한, 일본 그리고 중국은 북한의 핵시설을 파괴하기 위해 군사조치를 취하거나 미사일 방어체제 등에 의존하며 핵을 보유한 북한과 함께 살아가는 법을 배워야 할 것이다.

반면, 북한은 핵무기나 미사일 프로그램을 급진전 시킬 수 있는 많은 기회들을 흘려보냈다. 만약 북한이 제네바 합의에 동의하지 않았다면 그들은 핵 프로그램을 계속 발전시킬 수 있었을 것이다. 이러한 북한의 핵개발 억제는 핵무기가 북한의 안전을 위한 필수 요건이라는 주장과 모순된다. (그러나 만약 북한 지도부가 미국의 공격을 단념시키기에 1-2개의 핵무기면 충분하다고 느꼈다면 이러한 상황 또한 시나리오 1)로 설명 가능하다.)

2) 두 번째 시나리오는 북한 지도층이 그들의 안보와 주권이 보장된다면 기꺼이 핵과 미사일 프로그램 개발 중단 협상에 응할 것이라는 점을 말해준다.

북한 지도층은 미국의 우월한 군사력과 북한을 경제적, 정치적으로 고립시키려는 시도에 위기감을 느낀다. 따라서 북한은 체제를 보장해 줄 수 있는 미국과의 새로운 관계 구축을 위해 필요한 협상력을 갖고, 경제 개혁에 유리한 환경을 조성하기 위해 핵무기와 탄도 미사일 개발을 추구하게 된다. 즉, 협상 과정에서의 북한의 불리한 위치를 강화시키고 미국이 새로운 북-미 관계에 합의하도록 하기 위한 도구로서 핵무기와 미사일 프로그램을 개발한다는 것이다. 이 시나리오를 뒷받침하는 증거로서 북한이 핵과 미사일 개발을 제한하고 미사일 수출을 중단하기 위한 미국과의 협상에 응하겠다고 반복적으로 의사를 전달해왔다는 것이다. 제네바 합의, 미사일 실험 중단, 클린턴 행정부와의 대화 또한 이 주장에 힘을 실어준다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 때, 북한의 고농축 우라늄 개발 또한 경제, 안보 협상에서 유리한 고지를 차지하기 위한 계산된 행동이라 볼 수 있다.

다른 한편으로 북한은 제네바 합의를 비롯한 국제적 약속들을 어김으로써 차후 협상을 어렵게 만들었다. 미국, 일본, 남한, 중국은 모두 북한이 대대적인 경제, 정치 개혁을 추진할 것을 바라며 이를 지원할 것이다. 하지만 지나친 개방은 체제 유지를 어렵게 할지 모른다는 두려움 때문에 북한은 망설이게 될 것이다. 이러한 안보 불안은 분명히 주변국과의 관계 개선에 불필요한 요인으로 작용할 것이다.

3) 북한 지도부가 핵무기 보유와 미국, 일본, 남한과의 관계 개선 둘 다를 동시에 추구하는 경우이다.

세 번째 시나리오에 따르면 북한 지도부는 미국, 일본, 남한과의 관계 개선을 위해 노력하는 동시에 대량살상무기(WMD) 개발을 통해 선택의 여지를 남겨두고자 할 것이다. 만약 미국이 협상에서 북한측이 받아들일 수 있는 제안을 한다면 북한은 핵과 미사일 프로그램을 기꺼이 포기할 것이다. 하지만, 그 반대의 경우 북한은 핵무기와 미사일 프로그램을 통해 그들의 군사작전능력을 발전시키는 방향으로 계속 나아갈 것이다.

그 밖에 북한 지도부가 계획적으로 모두를 속일 가능성도 배제할 수 없다. 북한은 핵무기 사용능력을 발전시킬 때까지 경제적 이익도 얻고 시간도 벌기 위한 의도로 WMD 프로그램의 개발과 수출을 제한하는데 합의할 지도 모른다. 그게 아니라면, 북한 지도부는 미국, 일본, 남한이 북한의 불확실한 북한의 핵무기 개발 상황을 감시하기 위해 관계를 개선하려 할 것이라 믿고 있을 것이다. 북한의 미사일 개발에 대한 우려에도 불구하고, 남한이 “햇볕정책”을 추구하고 최근 일본이 관계 정상화 움직임을 보이는 것도 이러한 주장을 뒷받침하고 있다.

이 시나리오는 북한 지도부가 그들의 ‘벼랑 끝 전술’과 눈속임에 대한 국제 사회의 부정적인 평가를 잘못 평가하고 있거나 그러한 부정적인 결과를 한번의 협정으로 극복할 수 있다고 믿고 있을 가능성을 시사한다.

4) 북한 안보를 보장하는 최선의 방책으로서 핵무기 개발이냐 미국과의 협정 채결이냐를 두고 북한 지도부/정파간에 이견이 엇갈리는 경우이다.

이 네 번째 시나리오는 북한의 일관성 없는 행동들이 국내의 서로 다른 정파들 간의 권력 이동에서 야기되는 것임을 잘 보여주고 있다. 각 정파들은 독자적으로 다른 정파의 주장에 반대되는 국제적 행동들을 수행할 수 있다. 이러한 권력 투쟁은 북한이 종종 협조적인 태도를 보이다가도 돌연 위협적인 반응을 보이는 이유를 잘 설명해준다.

이 시나리오는 왜 북한이 농축 우라늄 프로그램 개발에 치중하는지도 말해준다. 제네바 합의 이행이 지연됨에 따라 평양의 힘의 균형은 북한 안보를 보장하기 위한 핵무기 개발 쪽으로 기울게 된 것이다. ( 그 밖에 북한이 파키스탄으로부터 고농축 우라늄 개발 기술과 생산 장비를 들여오고자 했다는 것 또한 제네바 합의를 파기하고 정권 붕괴를 막기 위한 결정이었다는 것을 보여준다.)

비록 이러한 설명이 돌발적이고 모순된 북한의 행동을 설명할 수 있다 하더라도, 때때로 협상 환경을 조성하고 신중한 행동과 발언을 통해 협상 대상자에게 최대한 압력을 가하는 북한의 협상스타일은 ‘정파 모델’로는 설명하기 어려운 부분이다. 북한 내부의 정파간의 역학관계를 이용하는 것은 지속 가능한 협상 결과를 도출해 내는 것을 어렵게, 혹은 더 나아가 불가능하게 만들 수 있다는 것을 숙지해야 한다.

결론

위에서 논의된 네가지 시나리오는 북한의 행동이 비이성적이지 않으며 예측 불가능하고 그 진의를 파악하기 어렵다는 것은 협상시 유리할 수 있다는 점을 시사해준다. 위기 환경을 조성하기 위한 북한의 WMD프로그램 이용 능력은 외교적으로 별로 잃을 것이 없는 체제의 중요한 협상용 자산이다. 그러나 벼랑끝 전술은 위험한 게임임을 알아야 한다. 왜냐하면 벼랑 끝으로 미끄러져 내릴 가능성이 언제나 상존하기 때문이다.

(원문)

Confronting Ambiguity: How to Handle North Korea’s Nuclear Program

Phillip Saunders

Arms Control Association

March 3, 2003.

One of the challenges in dealing with North Korea is assessing the true intentions behind its nuclear weapons program. Have North Korean leaders decided that nuclear weapons are essential to the regime’s survival, making a negotiated deal impossible? Or is the nuclear weapons program a bargaining chip that North Korea is prepared to trade away for the right price? The question is hard to answer. One problem is that reliable information about the internal dynamics of North Korean decisionmaking is scarce. A second problem is that North Korean leaders have strong incentives to conceal their true intentions in order to maximize their bargaining power and to minimize international reactions to their nuclear weapons program.

A review of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis illustrates this point. By 1993, U.S. officials were concerned that North Korea had secretly reprocessed spent fuel from its 5 Megawatt research reactor at Yongbyon to produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon. The United States considered military strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities, but ultimately decided to negotiate. The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to abandon construction of two gas-graphite moderated nuclear reactors, freeze reprocessing of spent fuel from its research reactor, accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of its declared nuclear facilities, and eventually come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement by allowing the IAEA to reconstruct the operational history of its research reactor to verify that no nuclear material was missing. In return, South Korea, Japan, and the United States agreed to participate in an international consortium that would construct two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors and supply North Korea with heavy fuel oil to produce electricity until the new reactors were operational. The United States also agreed to provide formal assurances against the use or threat of nuclear weapons against North Korea and to take steps to lift economic sanctions and improve political relations.

The Agreed Framework capped North Korea’s ability to produce more plutonium for nuclear weapons, but did not answer the question of whether North Korea had enough plutonium to make nuclear weapons. North Korean negotiators rebuffed U.S. efforts for immediate special inspections that would answer this question. A key North Korean objective in the 1994 negotiations appeared to be to maintain ambiguity about its nuclear status for as long as possible to maximize its bargaining power. If inspections revealed that North Korea did not have enough plutonium for nuclear weapons, the United States would take North Korea less seriously, reducing Pyongyang’s negotiating leverage. Conversely, if inspections revealed that North Korea already had sufficient plutonium to build weapons, the United States might not agree to a deal. The compromise struck in the Agreed Framework required IAEA special inspections that would answer questions about North Korea’s nuclear history before key components of the two nuclear reactors would be delivered. This allowed North Korea to maintain ambiguity about its nuclear capabilities–and bargaining leverage over the United States–for an additional eight years. (The U.S. Intelligence Community concluded in the mid-1990s that North Korea had probably produced one or two nuclear weapons with secretly reprocessed plutonium.)

This background information is helpful in assessing North Korea’s goals in the current crisis and its longer-term nuclear intentions. The current crisis began in October 2002 when U.S. officials confronted North Korea with evidence of a uranium enrichment program (which is a second path to the development of nuclear weapons). North Korean officials reportedly admitted the existence of a nuclear weapons program and began a series of steps to pressure the United States to negotiate directly, despite the U.S. government’s insistence that it would not “reward bad behavior” with concessions. North Korea’s stated objectives are to obtain U.S. recognition of North Korea’s sovereignty, security assurances, and no hindrance of the North’s economic development. North Korea officials have stated that despite withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea does not intend to produce nuclear weapons “at this time.”

Four scenarios should be considered in examining North Korea’s nuclear intentions:

1) North Korean leaders have decided that nuclear weapons are essential to their security.

This scenario argues that North Korean leaders feel threatened by superior U.S. military capabilities and by U.S. talk about “regime change” and “pre-emptive strikes.” North Korean leaders may have concluded that nuclear weapons are the only way to guarantee regime survival in the face of potential U.S. nuclear threats. (This scenario is consistent with U.S. intelligence assessments that North Korea produced one or two nuclear weapons in the mid-to-late 1990s.) If this is the case, there is probably no peaceful settlement that can stop or roll back the North Korean nuclear weapons program unless North Korean leaders change their minds. The United States, South Korea, Japan, and China must either take military action to destroy North Korean nuclear facilities and stockpiles, or learn to live with North Korean nuclear weapons by relying on deterrence and missile defenses to prevent their use. North Korea’s pursuit of multiple pathways to nuclear weapons and efforts to develop long-range ballistic missiles indicates that the regime has devoted considerable resources to developing deliverable nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, North Korea has passed up a number of opportunities to accelerate its nuclear and missile programs. If North Korea had not signed the Agreed Framework, it could have continued operation of its research reactor, completed construction on its 50 Megawatt and 200 Megawatt reactors, and reprocessed the spent fuel to produce plutonium. By now, the regime could have had enough fissile material for at least 150-200 nuclear weapons. North Korea also declared a unilateral moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles (although static engine testing has continued). This restraint appears inconsistent with a decision that operational, deliverable nuclear weapons are essential for North Korean security. (However it might be explained if North Korean leaders feel that one or two nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter the United States from attacking.)

2) North Korean leaders are willing to negotiate their nuclear and missile programs away for a deal that guarantees their security and sovereignty.

This scenario argues that North Korean leaders feel threatened by superior U.S. military capabilities and by U.S. efforts to keep the North Korean regime isolated economically and politically. North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to create the leverage necessary to build a new relationship with the United States that will ensure the regime’s survival and create a better environment for economic reforms. The nuclear weapons and missile programs are intended to strengthen North Korea’s weak bargaining position and force the United States to agree to a new relationship.

Evidence for this scenario includes repeated statements by North Korean leaders about their willingness to negotiate deals with the United States to restrict their nuclear and missile capabilities and to curb missile exports. The Agreed Framework, the missile flight-test moratorium, and talks with the Clinton administration about a missile export deal are indicators of North Korea’s willingness to take actions which limit its WMD capabilities. From this perspective, North Korea’s efforts to develop a highly-enriched uranium capability are an effort to develop a new bargaining chip to trade for economic and security concessions. It is even possible that these efforts were intended to be discovered by the United States in order to be bargained away. (North Korea’s previous success in persuading the United States to increase food aid in exchange for inspecting a suspect nuclear facility at Kumchangri–which turned out to have no nuclear equipment–suggests that a nuclear bluff is a possibility.)

On the other hand, North Korea’s demonstrated willingness to cheat on international agreements (including the Agreed Framework) makes a future deal very difficult to negotiate. Stringent verification measures would be required because there is no trust on the U.S. side. Moreover, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China would all like to see North Korea pursue significant economic and political reforms. The door to better relations that would support North Korean economic reforms is wide open, but North Korea has been reluctant to walk through it, possibly due to fears that too much openness might undermine the regime’s political survival. Security threats are arguably unnecessary to achieve better relations (and may in fact undercut efforts to improve relations and prospects for economic cooperation).

3) North Korean leaders want BOTH nuclear weapons (as an ultimate security guarantee) AND better relations with the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Under this scenario North Korean leaders have sought to keep their options open by pursuing WMD programs while simultaneously seeking better relations with the United States, Japan, and South Korea. One possibility is that North Korean leaders view their nuclear and missile program as a hedge in case North Korea is unable to negotiate acceptable terms with the United States. If the United States puts an acceptable offer on the table, then North Korea would be willing to give up its nuclear and missile programs. If the United States does not deliver an acceptable deal, then North Korea will proceed to develop an operational force of missiles armed with nuclear weapons.

Another possibility is that North Korean leaders planned to cheat all along. Agreements to restrict WMD development programs and exports were intended to gain monetary benefits and to buy time until North Korea could develop an operational nuclear weapons capability. Alternatively, North Korean leaders may believe that the United States, Japan, and South Korea are willing to overlook a small, ambiguous North Korean nuclear weapons capability and improve relations anyway. South Korea’s “sunshine policy” and Japan’s recent efforts to move toward normalization of diplomatic relations despite concerns about North Korean missiles provide some support for this belief.

Both the hedge scenario and the cheat scenario explain some aspects of North Korea’s behavior, such as the relatively small scale of its nuclear weapons program, its willingness to accept temporary limits on the size of its nuclear arsenal (while pursuing efforts to develop more advanced capabilities), and its eagerness to reach out to the United States, Japan, and (to a lesser extent) South Korea. These scenarios suggest that North Korean leaders either miscalculated the negative international response to their nuclear brinkmanship and cheating or feel that the negative consequences can be overcome once an agreement is in place.

4) North Korean leaders/factions disagree about whether nuclear weapons or a negotiated agreement with the United States is the best way to achieve security.

This scenario views inconsistent North Korean behavior as the product of the shifting strength of different domestic political factions. One faction centered on the military may feel that nuclear weapons are essential to North Korean security; another may feel that a negotiated agreement offers more security. Each faction has some ability to undertake international actions independently of the other. Struggle between these factions explains switches between cooperative and threatening North Korean behavior.

This scenario offers an explanation of why North Korea sometimes acts cooperatively to seek agreements and sometimes behaves in a bellicose manner to undercut negotiations. If the analysis is broadened to consider North Korea’s recent market-oriented price reforms, the factions may include those who benefit under the current system (the military, state-owned enterprises, senior communist party members) vs. those who see the need for fundamental changes in the North Korean system. This scenario offers a potential explanation for why North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment program. As some of the promised benefits of the Agreed Framework (such as provision of the reactors and progress toward normalization of relations with the United States) were delayed, the balance of power in Pyongyang may have shifted away from engagement and toward efforts to develop nuclear weapons to ensure North Korea’s security. (Alternatively, North Korean efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technology and production equipment from Pakistan earlier would suggest a decision to cheat on the Agreed Framework or to hedge against the possibility of its collapse.)

Although this explanation can explain uncoordinated and inconsistent North Korean behavior, North Korea’s negotiating style sometimes emphasizes careful efforts to control the atmospherics of a negotiation and to maximize pressure on a negotiating partner through carefully coordinated actions and statements. This kind of control is difficult to explain with a factional model. It is also important to note that dealing with a changing balance of power between factions may make it hard (or impossible) to get a negotiated deal that will last.

Conclusion

Each of these four scenarios explains some aspects of North Korean behavior. Which is correct? Unfortunately it is hard to tell, because North Korean leaders have strong incentives to conceal their intentions. If North Korean leaders have decided that nuclear weapons are necessary to assure their survival, then creating the impression that this decision was reluctantly forced upon them by U.S. unwillingness to negotiate may reduce negative international reactions. On the other hand, if North Korea is prepared to negotiate away its nuclear weapons capabilities, then it has incentives to appear reluctant and bellicose in order to strike the best possible bargain. The scarcity of reliable information about the internal dynamics of the North Korean regime makes it impossible to assess North Korea’s nuclear intentions based on inside information, while the regime’s strong incentives to conceal its true motives make it difficult to infer intentions from North Korean behavior. The four scenarios discussed above suggest that North Korea’s behavior is not irrational, and that there are some benefits to being unpredictable and hard to read in negotiations.

From the narrow perspective of negotiating tactics, North Korea may prefer repeated piecemeal deals in a crisis atmosphere to a one-time comprehensive deal, because its negotiating leverage would be greatly reduced if it gives up its nuclear option. However North Korea’s belligerent negotiating tactics may be costly if they prevent deals from being reached because its negotiating partners feel they cannot understand North Korea or trust its leaders to keep their agreements. If North Korea’s objective is to trade its WMD programs for a new relationship with the United States, its tactics may ultimately prove counter-productive. Competing assessments of North Korean intentions have already made it difficult for the United States to implement a consistent North Korea policy. North Korea’s ability to use its WMD programs to create a crisis atmosphere is an important source of leverage for a regime that has few diplomatic assets. However brinkmanship is a dangerous game, because there is always the possibility of sliding over the brink into