6자회담에서 모호한 입장을 취하고 있는 러시아의 대한반도 정책에 대한 분석.
한반도 내에서 전쟁을 초래할 가능성이 있는 미국의 독자 행동과 중국의 급속한 경제성장은 한반도에서의 러시아의 고립을 가져올 수 있다. 따라서 러시아는 한반도 문제해결에 적절한 위치를 차지하길 바라며, 이 6자회담의 지속과 남북간의 조율자로서의 역할을 기대하고 있다.
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Korea through the Russian looking glass
By Stephen Blank
As every observer of North Korea knows, all analyses of anything pertaining to that country are shrouded in ambiguity. Certainly this holds true for the Beijing-run six-party negotiation process regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. Indeed, making sense of what is transpiring at these talks is not unlike viewing the Japanese movie, Rashomon, in which each eyewitness recounts a different version of the truth as they saw it, or wanted to see it. Still, to understand what is going on in the North Korea talks, or at least to make some sense of the dynamics, it is important to understand the parties’ positions and their motives. One of the most intriguing is Russia.
The four parties, in addition to North and South Korea, are China, Japan, the United States and Russia, which sprawls through the Far East and shares a very short, 38-mile boundary with North Korea, its former communist ally. Once Moscow buttressed Pyongyang economically and politically, but no more.
One of the most opaque aspects of this process is Russia’s position and objectives on North Korea. Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov, Russia’s delegate to the recent talks in Beijing, voiced the common frustration that North Korea did not verify whether or not it has a uranium enrichment program underway and expressed the equally common disappointment that not more was achieved. Yet he simultaneously opined that progress was made because the parties have indicated they will continue to negotiate later in the spring and are setting up working groups to tackle relevant issues.
Losyukov also warned that failure to verify what the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is doing could lead the United States to undertake military action, but at the same time he indicated uncertainty as to whether North Korea indeed has a nuclear program. Although the Russian government, from President Vladimir Putin on down is on record as strongly opposing nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, neither Losyukov nor his government has indicated just what they think should be done to prevent it. Losyukov said that his government supports South Korea’s proposal to give energy assistance to the North should it dismantle the nuclear program, yet Moscow remains unclear – or has not stated – which step must come first, dismantling or assistance – nor has it described how Russia visualizes a verifiable regime of inspections to confirm that North Korea has ended its program.
The fact that North Korea has broken every previous agreement its signed regarding its nuclear program does not seem to play a role in Russian public diplomacy on how to ensure that this does not happen again. Instead, Losyukov is trying to push Washington to give Pyongyang energy and other forms of aid without specifying just how the US and Russia can be certain about the termination of the North’s nuclear program.
Understanding Russia’s conflicting stands
At the same time, though, Losyukov is not expressing any particular dismay that North Korea clearly wants to retain a nuclear program and obtain these forms of assistance. Therefore the question is: how can one understand Russia’s position concerning North Korea and what lies behind it?
Russia’s interests are rooted in its history, geography and policy, and understanding the hierarchy of objectives governing Russia’s position on the Koreas may help make sense of the apparent contradictions inherent in its policy.
First of all, Moscow, like the other four partners outside of the DPRK, and perhaps Pyongyang too, is most worried about war and the need to prevent the onset of conflict. That shared anxiety is what creates a common negotiating space for the five states seeking to roll back the North’s nuclear program. But beyond that important commonality, there are divergences among the parties, creating situations in which it becomes harder for all to agree and reach consensus; instead, one or two states agree with each.
Historically Russia has fought four wars in the 20th century to prevent Northern Korea, with whom it shares a territorial boundary near the Pacific Ocean, from falling prey to hostile powers. Those wars were the Russo-Japanese war from 1904-05; the undeclared war with Japan in 1938-39 that took place mainly in Manchuria; Russia’s invasion of Manchuria and Korea, the culminating offensive of World War II in Asia in August,1945; and Russian pilots’ participation in the air war during the Korean War of 1950-53.
In all cases, the point was, and is, not the unification of the Korean peninsula as such. Rather it is the conditions under which the peninsula might be united that concerned – and still do concern Moscow.
Most important is that Moscow, in approaching the two Koreas and the issue of terminating the unfinished Korean war between them, is the weakest of all the outside powers and one that is acutely aware of how little it brings to the table. Moreover, what haunts the minds of policymakers from Putin down is that Russia, due to its current economic and military weakness, could easily be marginalized and excluded from any process bringing an end to hostilities on the peninsula, reunification and denuclearization.
Russia seeks recognition as legitimate actor
A war on the peninsula not only would endanger Russia’s security, it also would make it abundantly clear that it cannot contribute very much to the resolution of the conflict and would be as much the object of others’ policies as it would itself be an actor in Asia. Consequently, its overriding goal is simply to be recognized as a legitimate player in all the negotiations taking place in and around the Korean peninsula and to prevent war through its participation. If this means simply paying to play another round, so be it. It also means not being too particular as to how denuclearization is maintained if it is achieved at all.
For all of these reasons Moscow therefore believes that it needs to be on equally good terms with all parties. Every diplomatic initiative it has proffered regarding North Korea, dating back to former president Boris Yeltsin, revolves around getting everyone to see Russia as part of the solution, as a partner that can provide tangible political and material resources to a peaceful resolution of the issues there and whose participation is legitimate. While this explains why it is ready to provide electricity and energy to North Korea if asked, the fact is that for decades Washington has sought to minimize the Russian role in North Korea.
Until US President George W Bush gratuitously offered Russia an uncompensated role here in the North Korea talks, Moscow had nothing to offer and few parties wanted it involved. It was only once Putin successfully persuaded North Korea that it could be a useful interlocutor that Pyongyang said it wanted Russia involved. Undoubtedly it did so to offset China whose power is too great and whose border too long for its comfort. But Washington, which was not under any compulsion to draw Moscow into the process, did so, and required no compensation for doing it, thus giving Putin an easy victory at no discernible cost.
Thus, Russia has been freed from the responsibility of actually having to offer comprehensive proposals and to a considerable degree can be a free rider at these talks. Which means Moscow has so far succeeded in getting a seat at the table even though it apparently has no independent ideas of its own on how to proceed and precious few resources to give away in order to craft a solution.
Fears of marginalization
Despite it’s seat at the table, Russia continues to fear its potential marginalization in Asia generally, and Korea in particular, fears which are traced to two primary concerns:
First, that the US penchant for unilateral action may bring about a war – hence Losyukov’s warnings about the dangers of unilateral US military action. A war would bring about a situation inherently dangerous and unpredictable, especially if the DPRK has nuclear weapons.
And second, that rising Chinese economic power will marginalize Moscow’s ability to play a major role in Korea.
Russia is anxious over China’s rising power because Moscow has major economic interests tied to its geopolitical objectives of maintaining North and South Korea in balance, integrating the North with the rest of the world, and using the two Koreas to help Russia’s own stricken Eastern and Asian provinces recover economically. Thus it is seeking debt repayment from the North, even if its has to sell arms to Pyongyang. Moscow also encourages the North to reform, seeks either to pay off or have its debts forgiven by South Korea, and take advantage of its proximity to the Korean peninsula to construct its so-called Iron Silk Road, a railroad linking the two Koreas to the Trans-Siberian railroad and thus to Moscow and Europe.
The Iron Silk Road is of major geostrategic and economic significance to Russia. It would rival the European Union’s Silk Road project from Europe to the Pacific Ocean, through the Caucasus and Central Asia – bypassing Russia in its course. And the Russian project, if undertaken, would also rival China’s efforts to build a pan-Asian railway and advance its transport infrastructure.
Furthermore, a war on the Korean peninsula and/or any monopolization of aid to North Korea by Washington or Beijing would exclude Moscow from economic and political consideration, leaving its rundown and underdeveloped eastern provinces acutely vulnerable, mainly to Chinese economic pressure. Either or both of these contingencies – conflict or exclusion of Moscow from aiding North Korea – also makes it impossible to realize Russia’s economic and political objectives regarding its Asiatic trade or the development of North Korea.
Thus, beyond being accepted as a legitimate part of any Korean “peace process”, it is also essential for Moscow to be deeply involved, to whatever extent possible, in the economic dimensions of a solution to the Korean dilemma. Moreover, it does not want to have to choose among Beijing, Seoul and Washington, realizing that doing so makes it vulnerable to pressure from China or the US.
Seeking a role in the big issues of Asian security
Last, the legitimization of Russia’s participation in the six-power North Korea process opens possibilities for its equally legitimate participation in broader multilateral discussions, either in number or in scope, concerning the great questions of Asian security, a position that Moscow covets but which has hitherto proved elusive.
Arguably these concerns and the need to balance them to stave off nuclearization, war, or the collapse of North Korea – which also would enhance Beijing’s and Washington’s clout, not Moscow’s – govern Putin’s and Losyukov’s efforts. These concerns and fears inform Moscow’s simultaneous warnings to Pyongyang to denuclearize and to Washington to refrain from provocative acts, and its support for aid to the North based on its comparative advantage in energy and electricity in the region.
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Moscow wants the talks to go on, whatever difficulties they encounter, and regards their mere continuation as progress. Likewise, it is clear why Russia wants North Korea to denuclearize and is not so insistent on the specifics of a verification regime and compensation to the DPRK in the field of energy – as long as it is included in both aspects of that part of the solution.
Similarly these goals also explain why Russia tries to maintain close ties to both North and South Korea, not to mention Beijing and Washington. Finally, this hierarchy or framework of concerns driving Russian policy also explains its very high and sustained interest in inducing the North to undertake economic reconstruction to which Moscow can contribute – but from which it also can benefit.
This assessment of Russia’s position at the North Korea talks cannot answer all the questions regarding those negotiations, or even concerning Russia’s position as the talks go on. But seeking greater clarity and trying to dispel the fog of ambiguity that envelops North Korea is valuable for its own sake and can help the other parties understand Moscow’s goals. Now that it is an accepted interlocutor in this process – even though it gave nothing to gain this seat at the table – a clearer insight into Moscow’s objectives and positions is a necessary, if insufficient, step in making progress and reaching a mutually acceptable solution to the threat of a nuclear North Korea.
Stephen Blank is an analyst of international security affairs residing in Harrisburg, PA.
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