평화군축센터 미분류 2003-12-30   781

The Capture of Hussein, No Reason for Dispatching Korean Troops

Another wishful thinking on Iraq surfaced after the capture of Saddam Hussein; that it would armed resistance in Iraq, and likely create a better situation for dispatching troops. This makes yet another groundless and dangerous attempt for justifying an unjustifiable military act by the ROK government.

In Iraq, there are only a few anti-coalition groups who support Hussein, and the connection between the resistance and him has not been found yet. The Provisional Authority in Iraq is much more careful in making such speculation on the matter of resistance. When Hussein’s sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed last July, expectations that their deaths would lessen the capacity of resistant power were very soon proved to be false.

Certainly, the political impact of the capture of Saddam Hussein is more complex. The majority of Iraqis, the Shiites and the Kurds in particular, have detested the tyrant and large sections of them are celebrating his capture. However, this does not make them supportive of the US occupation.

The absence of Hussein in Iraqi resistance will rather weaken the legitimacy of the US occupation of Iraq. Bush’s re-emphasis on “the war on terrorism” right after the capture of Hussein reflects the weakened cause for military occupation of Iraq. Iraqi political groups are more and more voicing together for the “withdrawal of the occupation forces and their own self-government.” At the same time, with the worry of Hussein’s reemergence gone, anti-Americanism will now be a less risky choice to the Shiites. Many Middle East experts anticipate a time-bomb ticking by which the US will face a heavy blow from the growing anti-Americanism among the Shiites as they take more political actions on this line.

In short, it is unclear that armed conflict will diminish in Iraq, while the possibility of popular political struggle against the US occupation remains live and rising. This is the situation where the Korean troops will find themselves in: they are very likely to be greeted by the cynicism and hostility of Iraqis saying “No Hussein, No Danger, and No More Foreign Troops!” while insurgent attacks continues. It has already been amply demonstrated that the Iraqis are strongly in favor of ‘reconstruction and self-security by Iraq people.’ In this, there are no reasons for the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq.

The government and some media present selfish interpretation of the cause in this case, ‘security of Korea’ by defending the US interest, or imagining ‘Safer Iraq’ by doing so. There is absolutely no ground to believe in ‘Safer Iraq’ for Koreans when the fully armed Korean troops land without the consent of the Iraqi people and patrol Iraqi towns under the US military command, especially after actual attacks on Koreans in Iraq have already begun already. Glossy projection of ‘security of Korea’ or ‘safer Iraq’ is deeply unethical in inducing people toward a certain cover-up of a very serious situation, where innocent civilians are daily captured, interrogated and killed by illegitimate occupation by foreign troops.

In justifying it s decision to send troops to Iraq, the ROK government maintains that the ROK-US cooperation concerning North Korea’s nuclear program takes priority over other security matters. This is known as ‘strategy of linking the dispatch to resolution of nuclear issue’, with the assumption that the US will work towards a peaceful resolution of the Korean issue, if ROK supports the US military option in Iraq. Until now, this approach looks more like a wishful thinking than a strategic one, as there are no clear signs for a change in Washington’s hard-line policy towards Pyongyang. The much hoped-for second six-party talk failed to materialize within this year, due to the US rigid demand for North Korea’s unilateral abandonment of its nuclear weapons any negotiations take place.

We see no progress in Washington in creating favorable conditions for negotiations on the nuclear issue in Korea. We are concerned that the North Korean Freedom Act of 2003 now presented in the US Congress and Washington’s plan to press North Korea further in the 2004 NPT conference will aggravate the environment for talks even further.

We demand that all parties adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution over North Korean issues by talks and negotiations, and that the proposed six-party talk need to be resumed as soon as possible. North Korea and the US, in this respect, should simultaneously engage in steps to abandon nuclear facilities and missile tests and to reduce sanctions and resume energy supply, respectively.

Center

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