Wrong Calculation and Wrong Negotiation in Secrecy

statement issued on June 28, 2010

Economic Sovereignty to Be Renounced
in Return of the Postponement of Military Sovereignty Transfer

1. At G-20 Toronto Summit, the Republic of Korea and the United States agreed to postpone the return of the wartime operational control to the Republic of Korea to 2015, three years later than initially agreed.  Furthermore, there was an agreement by both parties to make “adjustments” on the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) to obtain US congressional approval by this year.  It is clear what Korea determined to give; however, it remains uncertain what is to be received.

2. Except in a few areas such as an automobile trade, the KORUS FTA is an agreement for comprehensive market liberalization mainly in favor of the US.  Moreover, it was an unfair negotiation under which Korea promised to import US beef and abolish the screen quota system as preconditions for the initial agreement of the KORUS FTA. The US beef import was a national concern, over which candlelight vigils took place nationwide criticizing the Lee administration’s dogmatic agreement to import beef from cows over 30 months old.  As a result, President Lee publicly apologized to the people, and the administration was forced to renegotiate with the US to limit beef imports to cows less than 30 months old.  Instead, the Lee administration, while postponing the already decided return of the wartime control, agreed to “adjustment strategies” that may retreat the automobile negotiation initially signed under similar conditions and the US beef import negotiation.

3. Would the return of wartime operational control put our national security at a serious risk? It is difficult to accept the administration’s stance on this issue.  The statement made by the Korean government – the Cheonan warship incident reminded people the importance of strengthening the Korea-US response readiness – is not as realistic compared to its sensational aspect.  According to the press, at the time of the Cheonan warship incident, the ROK-US Combined Forces were holding joint military drills to prepare for the return of the wartime operational control. The training included drills against submarine attacks and removal of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. These types of military training are realizable only when the ROK-US Combined Forces are in possession of overwhelming force. Upon bilateral agreement by Korea and US, the return of wartime control underwent preparatory operations with a significant budget, development of strategic planning, and military training for some time. Apart from all these, it is shameful for the nation having ranked 6th to 7th in the world’s military power to blame its military capability so that it would give up its wartime operational control to a foreign country, which constitutes a matter of sovereignty.

4. Another crucial problem is the fact that the negotiation took place secretly, misleading the public. The negotiation process has been strictly confidential: the press coverage was limited (requested embargo) because these issues were being dealt at the Summit.  The Korean government not only delayed the return of Korean sovereignty via wartime operational control, but also conceded the democratic control over diplomacy, another sovereignty of the nation.  The US president proposed the KORUS FTA adjustment based on detailed requests and restrictions by the US congress, which makes a stark contrast to the counterpart of the Republic of Korea.

5. In conclusion, the Lee administration agreed in favor of US by allowing renegotiations of automobile trade and beef import, where the people’s specific interests and safety is paramount, in return for the postponement of the wartime operational control return, the long-awaited wish that has been postponed for over 20 years.  The Korean government yielded too much national interest as well as sovereignty in order to obtain the symbolic friendship between the two nations.  In addition, it renounced democratic diplomacy as it did in 2008 US beef import negotiation.  The PSPD strongly denounces the government’s closed-door diplomacy and calls for withdrawal of this unreasonable agreement.