SOLUTIONS TO KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS II AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

SOLUTIONS TO KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS II AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Peter Sylvestre (Pssylve@hotmail.com)

Institute of Foreign Language Studies

Korea University

INTRODUCTION

Like a sequel to a bad B-Grade movie, a rerun of the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis is seemingly scheduled for the summer and fall of 2003. The trailer to this crisis came with President George Bush’s “Axis of Evil” reference during his January 2002 State of the Union address. Overturning the previous administration’s policy of coaxing North Korea into the sunshine, the Bush administration insisted that North Korea cease its nuclear weapons programs as a precondition to dialog. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, confronting the North Korean regime with evidence of its secret weapons program during his October visit to Pyongyang, got more than he bargained for: a defiant verification. Washington responded in late November by freezing oil shipments to North Korea, which in turn retaliated by expelling IAEA monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear plant and reopening its facilities (December 2002), withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (January 2003) and reactivating Yongbyon (February 2003). Tensions further increased with North Korean missile launches in the East Sea and the interception of a US surveillance aircraft. With President Bush’s fixation on Saddam Hussein apparently broken, the White House is now free to focus on another regime that President Bush openly loathes.

Resolving, or at least managing, this crisis is of great interest not only to both Koreas and the United States but also to the well-being of the entire East Asian region and the global economy. However, determining the probable “endgame” of this crisis is fraught with speculation as North Korean regime dynamics have consistently defied virtually every prediction. April 2003 alone witnessed precursor events to both conflict and cooperation. Pessimists could point to an alleged Pentagon plan to launch a preemptive strike at Yongbyon and North Korean assertions during the Beijing talks that it had amassed a nuclear arsenal. Optimists could take comfort that those talks occurred at all and both could point to the relocation plan of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK), which will mean that US and DPRK forces will no longer face each other directly.

FRAMEWORK

As this author is reluctant to join those whose reputations have run aground on the shifting sands of North Korean policy, this paper will assume a different tact. Instead of predicting the outcome of Korean Nuclear Crisis II and likely being proved wrong, this paper describes a range of options (divided into three categories) available to the US and the current DPRK regime. The first (Option A), maintaining the status-quo, is essentially passive in that the parties do not seek a conclusive resolution. The other two: Confrontation (Option B) leading to the removal of one protagonist, and cooperation (Option C) that at least partially meets the needs of both parties, provide final solutions to the crisis, but with vastly different ramifications. For each option, a four-step framework is applied: (a) option description, (b) prerequisites, i.e. perceptions, outlook, and calculations, necessary for the pursuit of that option, (c) prospects, i.e. the current direction of events and trends regarding that option, and (d) implications. Through this framework, the difficulty in predicting whether one option is more likely to be pursued becomes clear. Decision-makers may hold conflicting assumptions and perceptions that could lead them to pursue more than one option simultaneously. In fact, events leading to each of the three options are currently underway

OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO PROTAGONISTS

Postulations on Pyongyang’s objectives in pursuing nuclear brinkmanship range from a calculated, rational attempt to exact vital economic sustenance to Kim Jong-il’s personal vanity in seeing himself center stage in global politics. Two prevailing hypotheses (apart from a blatant maneuver to drive America out and extort South Korea into surrender), currently making the rounds and summarized by Marcus Noland (Korea Times, 25 April 2003) are (1) North Korea is pursuing strategic and economic concession through “atomic trick or treat” and (2) Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of its survival. If the first is accurate, Pyongyang will rationally pursue a cost-benefit approach, minimizing the cost (possible war and regime change) while seeking to maximize the return on its investment (aid and/or security). Therefore, North Korea should opt for some form of resolution and avoid all-out conflict (which would exponentially increase the cost side of the equation). If the second is accurate, then Pyongyang’s nuclear program results in a classic security dilemma, providing the prospect of keeping the US at bay while threatening to provoke the very response that it is designed to ward off. If regime security is North Korea’s main objective, then Kim Jong-il’s perceptions of US intentions are critical. If he views the US as an inherent threat to his regime that cannot be fended off through negotiation, he should pursue the development of nuclear arms as an ultimate guarantee. If he concludes that confrontation is riskier for regime preservation than accepting US guarantees, he should pursue a negotiated settlement.

The objectives of the United States are more straightforward. As one of the official rationales of the US military presence over the past fifty years has been to preserve and protect the ROK, any outcome that could negatively affect the well-being of USFK would be inherently contradictory. The well-being criterion requires US decision-makers to perform cost-benefit analyses regarding ROK security. Moreover, just as the possession of nuclear weapons poses a classic security dilemma for Pyongyang, the presence of USFK also invokes the classic security dilemma in that it may be provoke the very response that it is designed to prevent.

The “War on Terror,” however, introduces a new dynamic where concern over “evil rogue” threats to US homeland security conflict with concern for ally security. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons threatens not only the ROK and Japan but also the United States itself, either directly once its missile technology develops the necessary range and delivery systems or indirectly through exports to other “rogue” states. Thus, the US may feel compelled to remove Pyongyang’s nuclear fangs before they strike. However, the US would face the prospect of destroying Korea to save the US.

1. Option A: Continuity

A. Description

The first option toward the second Korean nuclear crisis is to continue the response to the first Korean nuclear crisis: general maintenance of the status quo ante (Kumho never went on line, KEDO is moribund and the nuclear issue is back). Under this scenario, Kim’s brinkmanship does not rise to the point where it precipitates a US military response. Pyongyang builds nuclear weapons but does not export them as that probably would trigger a pre-emptive strike. For its part, the US grudgingly learns to live with the existence of a nuclearized DPRK. Essentially, the conflict is delayed but not resolved.

Pyongyang’s pursuit of brinkmanship exacerbates regime paradoxes. As it builds up its nuclear forces, its defense posture and thus its bargaining power increases. However, so too does alarm among its neighbors and the DPRK’s economic collapse accelerates as its three major donors-the US, South Korea and Japan-turn off the tap. The European Union likely follows suit and China and Russia indicate their displeasure at Kim Jong-il’s unsettling diplomacy. Thus, desperation in the DPRK intensifies without any foreseeable amelioration, resulting in more regional tension, economic deterioration and refugees. Thus, a continuation of neither war nor peace becomes highly unstable as it offers no “endgame” in itself. Ultimately, the only viable endgames are implosion, explosion (Option B) or international integration (Option C).

The US response depends on the perceived threat level to the US homeland. At a minimum, the US responds economically and diplomatically by applying sanctions as Pyongyang has effectively already sanctioned itself through its behavior and economic destitution. Washington, recognizing the ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions, urges multilateral sanctions (particularly from China and Russia), which Pyongyang has repeatedly described as being “tantamount to war,” in which case continuity (Option A) shifts to conflict (Option B).

Militarily, the US imposes a naval (and possible aerial) blockade to prevent nuclear weapons from being exported, which could result in conflict. Strategically, the US responds by either reinforcing its military presence in Korea or reducing them. Although “standing tall” been the preferred modus operandi of the Bush administration when confronting “evil,” internal Korean political dynamics has inadvertently created a more flexible option. As the DPRK creates a nuclear arsenal and as the ROK places more limits on US military options, the Pentagon withdraws USFK from Korea completely, instead of merely consolidating it south of Seoul, thereby mitigates possible DPRK retaliatory action and ROK veto power and increasing strategic and tactical flexibility (as the US air and naval power could strike at North Korea while the DPRK would have limited retaliatory options). Japanese vulnerability could be mitigated through a US withdrawal from Japan as well.

B. Prerequisites

Crisis management without resolution requires two essential prerequisites. First, Pyongyang must identify and respect the boundary between what is tolerable and intolerable to Washington, i.e., ensure that its brinkmanship does not go over the brink either intentionally or unintentionally. This in turn requires a firm understanding of the Bush administration, a trait Pyongyang apparently does not possesses. Compounding this problem is that the Bush administration itself may not have a preconceived notion of where the brink is and may respond instinctively to some unforeseen trigger event. Although the DPRK is more likely to push the envelope successfully if it adopts an incremental approach where each new step is but one ratchet upward in the escalation, Kim Jong-il seems to prefer dramatic, eye-catching pronouncements. For its part, the Bush administration must calculate the cost of a potential war as outweighing the costs of continuity and containment. In short, Washington must at no time perceive Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal as posing an urgent threat requiring military response.

C. Prospects

So far, events seem to be supporting this scenario. Whereas Bush felt confident taking on Iraq with impunity, his relatively restrained response to repeated North Korean provocations suggest that he realizes while the DPRK may collapse quickly under a US onslaught, the opposite could also be true and only an actual war can answer the question. As a result, “Canberra sources close to US thinking believe it more likely that even if the regime were to proceed with its reprocessing plans, the US would reluctantly accept a nuclear-armed DPRK and bend all its efforts to preventing it from selling nuclear weapons, or the attendant technology, to outsiders.” (The Australian, 22 April 2003)

The US initially deployed a strategic bomber wing to Guam in March as a warning to Pyongyang, suggesting a predilection for standing tall on “Freedom’s Frontier.” However, recent Pentagon actions suggest the possibility for a far more sophisticated defense structure. In mid-April, the USFK, following up on Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s announcement in February that USFK would “end up making adjustments,” unveiled a radical redeployment plan that would remove US forces from numerous bases scattered around Korea to essentially four locations: Osan, Pyongtaek, Daegu and Busan, with a probable troop reduction.

D. Implications

The implications of a muddling through can largely be seen in the course of the last decade, only this time exacerbated by the lack of the KEDO diplomatic veneer, which enabled the two sides to function through an Agreed Framework. The ultimate result of this approach was the maintenance of peace for a decade at the expense of supporting a worsening economic and military nightmare while merely postponing the eventual cost of a final solution. Economically, continuation of the present situation will incur security costs equaling at least their existing levels for all countries concerned. Heightened tension without end will dampen foreign investment most dramatically in South Korea but all countries in the region will experience a general economic slowdown due to pervasive fear.

The larger costs, however, will merely be postponed. Absent meaningful reform, the economy of the DPRK will continue to deteriorate. As more people are exposed to life outside the DPRK through flight or become increasingly desperate, the regime will be tempted to yet again shake its nuclear rattle. In short, the implications of a muddling through is Korean Nuclear Crisis III sometime in the future, at which point the threat will be even graver, exacerbating the costs of any ultimate resolution either through war or peace. Essentially, the first option is unstable in the long run, leaving only conflict (Option B) or negotiation (Option C) as effective long-term solutions.

2. Option B: Conflict

A. Description

As “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” the Bush administration, emboldened by its military success in Iraq, decides or feels compelled by North Korean provocations to resolve the dilemma of North Korea’s possession of nuclear arms by resorting to force. Such an action could mean either a “Rosy War,” where the Peoples Armed Forces (PAF) collapse quickly, or a “nasty war,” where North Korea lives up to its incendiary rhetoric to respond a “thousand-fold” to any US aggression.

The “Rosy War” scenario, emulating the military conflicts in Kuwait and Iraq, concludes with the People’s Armed Forces, possessing antiquated armaments, proving as hollow as Iraq’s. US “shock and awe” targeting of command and control centers paralyzes the “Party Center” and enthusiasm for Kim proves as ultimately ephemeral as enthusiasm for Saddam was in Iraq. Popular uprisings or indifference induces the elite to pack it in and Kim Jong-il seeks refuge in China.

That scenario, however, must be balanced by the “Nasty War” scenario. Described by analysts such as Franklin Fisher (Stars and Stripes, 9 February 2003), Doug Bandow (The Korea Herald, 25 April 2003) and many others, this scenario depicts the US shielding “the killbox” (a.k.a. Seoul in USFK parlance). A former North Korean official, Cho Myung-chul, warned “If we’re in a war, we’ll use everything. And if there’s a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative.” As Bandow astutely observes, “everything”‘ is a daunting force.” While US air power struggles to find the estimated 4,000 artillery pieces tucked away in the hills along the DMZ, North Korea’s homegrown “Shock and Awe” rains down into Seoul. With the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons not out of the question, up to 1 million casualties in the first 24 hours in Seoul alone is a possibility, as USFK projected.

B. Prerequisites

Should the United States strike first, its leaders’ calculations must conclude that either war will be short or offers the best (or least undesirable outcome). If the Bush administration operates under the Korean well-being criterion outlined above, it would have to conclude that either North Korea would not respond vigorously to a US pre-emptive strike for fear of inviting a full-scale US retaliatory response or anticipate that North Korea would simply cave in with costs below those of maintaining the status quo. Calculations of a rapid collapse are almost certainly based upon the obvious physical depreciation of North Korea’s industrial base since 1989 and the plummeting of living standards resulting in a sizeable exodus and subsequent exposure of North Koreans to the world. Should war prove “swift and sweet,” the Bush administration would be vindicated, but a “Nasty War” outcome would be a clear demonstration of fatal American miscalculation. Should the Oval Office operate under the criterion of US Homeland security primacy, it would have to calculate that the North Korean nuclear threat is so imminent and threatening (e.g. nuclear suitcases are exported to “rogue” elements) that the US must sacrifice Seoul to save Washington. The more North Korea is able to develop an offensive capability against US territory, the more likely the US emphasis will shift from preservation of Korea to preservation of the US.

Should North Korea strike first, its leadership must conclude that it has absolutely nothing to lose. Moreover, North Korean defense strategy emphasizes the primacy of attack over defense, asserting that victory is certain by striking first rather than waiting to absorb an almost certain fatal blow. The leadership has almost certainly concluded that the regime has a better chance of survival by going on the offensive.

Militarily, the prerequisites for a Rosy War involve at a minimum the neutralization of North Korea’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, the 4,000 artillery emplacements must be neutralized as well as the 100,000 special commandos the DPRK reportedly has before they can take to the sea or DMZ tunnels. As to whether all of these forces will dematerialize as cooperatively as their counterparts in Iraq have is beyond the scope of this paper and the expertise of this author.

C. Prospects

Already, two purported plans for dealing with North Korea have surfaced. The first, a preemptive strike directed at Yongbyon, assumes that North Korea is unwilling to confront US military might when push comes to shove. As The Australian reported (22 April 2003), “The Pentagon hawks believe the precision strikes envisaged in the plan would not lead to North Korea’s initiating a general war it would be certain to lose. The US would inform the North Koreans it was not aiming to destroy the regime of Kim Jong-il, but merely to destroy its nuclear weapons capacity.” However, Kim Jong-il is not likely to be reassured, given the Bush administration’s Iraq policy of starting with a demand for disarmament and ending with iconoclastic US armor running over images of Saddam. The second plan, surfacing this April after allegedly circulating around the Pentagon, envisions the removal of Kim Jong-il with Chinese assistance. Together with the specter of preemptive strike, these plans suggest that Washington may be seriously considering Option B.

Of course, “war could break out at almost any moment,” in the rhetoric of the (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), through unforeseen trigger events (such as a naval or aerial collision, tussle over a disclosed mineshaft straddling the DMZ etc) or blunder and miscalculation by either one or both parties. Brinkmanship played enthusiastically by both parties may very well result in both going over the brink. As the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the 1994 Korean Nuclear Crisis I nearly spun out of control in retrospect, the 2003 Korean Nuclear Crisis II could threaten to do the same.

D. Implications

A quick and relatively painless demise of the DPRK could serve as a catalyst for stimulating East Asian economic growth and integration. As the ROK would be unable to carry the burden of northern Korean reconstruction (or rather development) alone in providing investment and material, Chinese, Japanese and Russian construction and engineering firms would have their work cut out for them. The more international firms are involved, the more likely capital will be provided by national import-export credit agencies and grants as well as by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Long-term benefits are even brighter as the disappearance of the DPRK would allow for efficient integration of Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Russian transportation, energy and communication infrastructure, boosting growth in the entire region. Of course, Korea stands to gain most of all as the resources consumed by a combined military force of two million could be diverted to more productive investment that would actually benefit the Korean nation.

Conversely, a “Nasty War” would be catastrophic for Korea and quite possibly for Japan as well. The US itself would have possibly crippling economic costs and military casualties so high that a post-Korea syndrome could sap the desire of the US to continue the Pax Americana. At a minimum, Bush’s hold on the White House would be destroyed. This scenario would produce very few “winners” indeed and those contemplating this course should think very carefully what they wish for as they just might get it.

3. Option C: Cooperation

A. Description

The lack of clear winners resulting from either a possible “Nasty War” or a future possible “Nasty War” compels the search for a more palatable solution. Assessing the uncertainty and cost of outright conflict or festering tensions to all interested parties in the region, the US and the DPRK may consider a negotiated settlement. Such a settlement could either be one that establishes a multilateral security regime in which all members in the region participate or a more limited, bilateral arrangement focusing on the specific concerns of the US and the DPRK.

Essentially, the security regime at a minimum involves the eradication of the DPRk’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for guaranteed security while a more ambitious agreement leads to the de-militarization of the heavily militarized demilitarized zone. North Korea’s 1.2 million and South Korea’s 700,000-member armed forces could be reduced and the US forces removed from the peninsula. The treaty is guaranteed by at least both the US and China (Russia is also welcome) working in concert to ensure and verify that all parties fulfill their commitments. A more limited bilateral US-DPRK agreement involves the same limited trade-off between a (probably disguised) non-aggression pact or the removal of USFK and the destruction of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal of mass destruction. The non-aggression pact must include not only North Korea but also South Korea and Japan. Such outcomes end the purported mutual fears of both. North Korea without its weapons of mass destruction poses little threat to both the US and its allies South Korea and Japan while a non-aggression pact (especially one backed by a troop withdrawal) should reduce North Korea’s sense of being under siege. Both the US and North Korea could declare victory in their half-century standoff.

B. Prerequisites

The primary prerequisite for any successful negotiations is a degree of mutual trust and an ability to establish a “modus operandi.” Essentially, the parties must trust that the other will honorably fulfill its commitments. If not, at best the parties will negotiate an agreement only to surreptitiously undercut it. In short, Reagan’s negotiating motto, “Trust but verify” could easily be switched to “verify but trust.” When trust is lacking, negotiating positions often are reduced to “you first.” The second prerequisite for successful negotiations is mutual benefit. All parties must see themselves benefiting from a security regime involving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula if none is to undermine it. Thus, a northeast Asian multilateral regional regime must guarantee the security of all its members.

Kim Jong-il must conclude that negotiation offers a higher return than brinkmanship with George W. Bush, which may lead to highly unpleasant consequences for the survival of his regime. Whatever the regime’s actual objectives-regime survival, security from “aggression,” economic aid or even Kim’s personal aggrandizement-the regime must conclude that negotiation offers the highest return.

Likewise, the Bush administration also must conclude that a regional security regime offering security guarantees to Pyongyang is less unpalatable than either the “Nasty War” scenario or a protracted confrontation that could result in conflict. More fundamentally, the Bush Administration must conclude that North Korea is rationally pursuing its own self-interest. As David Shribman of the Pittsburgh Post Gazette (1 May 2003) observed on an “important overlooked truth,” “[d]espite its mindless Marxist rhetoric, Pyongyang has no real dispute with the United States.” Therefore, “the elements of a solution are at hand. The United States has lots of money. North Korea wants some of it. North Korea has nuclear facilities. The United States wants these facilities destroyed. Not too hard to guess how this problem is resolved-if everyone plays straight.” In short, the US could seek to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear the program in the same way that it did to Ukraine’s.

C. Prospects

Establishing a basis of trust in northeast Asia is a tall order. For one, North Korea’s deficit of international goodwill and trust presents a formidable obstacle to the fundamental prerequisite for a negotiated settlement. Pyongyang also has grounds for misgivings. The tortuous history of the Agreed Framework is one of delayed oil deliveries and reactor construction, which became North Korea’s official reason behind the resumption of Yongbyon. Revelations that the Clinton Administration entered into the KEDO Agreed Framework on the expectation that by the Pyongyang regime would not live long enough to see the completion of the Kumho also undermines US credibility in fulfilling any agreement that it enters into with North Korea. Thus, both sides have sufficient rationale to be deeply skeptical about the intentions of the other and dispelling that distrust may well prove impossible.

However, the seemingly swift implosion of the Baathist regime in Bagdad has understandably encouraged a more peaceful solution, presumably persuading Pyongyang in mid-April to agree to multilateral talks in Beijing. For its part, the US has shown a consistent willingness to resort to multilateral forums to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, allowing the IAEA to decide whether to bring the issue to the Security Council and objected relatively mildly (in comparison to Iraq) when rebuffed by China and Russia. Moreover, it participated in the Beijing talks in late April despite its steadfast objection to any bilateral forum (China’s self-described role was facilitator).

The Beijing Talks themselves provide grounds for both optimism and pessimism. North Korea both revealed its possession of nuclear weapons and offered a “New and Bold” multistage plan starting with a declaration of North Korean intent to forsake nuclear weapons in exchange for a resumption of fuel deliveries and culminating in nuclear disarmament in exchange for US security guarantees. However, North Korea, having outsmarted or deceived the US once into exchanging nuclear for fossil fuel, will have even less credibility than it possessed in 1994. Bush himself dismissed the North Korean offer as a continuation of the “old blackmail game” and Secretary of State Powell viewed the offer as nothing more than proposals “of a kind we have seen previously from them.”

D. Implications

The ramifications of a negotiated settlement of Korea Nuclear Crisis II would be profound and uniformly beneficial, both in what it would produce and what it would displace. Instead of the horrifying nightmare of “Nasty War,” the costs and uncertainty of “Rosy War” and the cost of the delaying tactics of continuing to muddle through, the region would experience a reduction in risk and expense and an increase in economic activity.

North Korea would see the removal of external threats to regime survival and the probable removal of US forces, which could provide the regime with a face-saving way out of its isolation. With the resumption of aid as a result, domestic pressure should ease, although the long-term survivability of North Korea would still remain uncertain. Should Pyongyang opt for a reduction in tension and its disproportionate military structure, Noland argues, the North Korean economy would have great difficulty in absorbing the shift in manpower and materiel. There is also a political dilemma. On one hand, the regime could claim victory in driving the US from the peninsula. On the other hand, it would remove the DPRK’s rationale for an “Army First Based Policy” and force the regime to confront economic collapse without being able to justify that collapse as the result of hegemonistic hostility. Finally, where else might Kim Jong-il’s focus be directed if he’s no longer fixated in planning, fighting and winning a hundred battles against the American aggressors? In short, Pyongyang’s raison d’etre and its modus operandi would become less convincing to its people. Nonetheless, a negotiated settlement offers the DPRK its best option as continued confrontation would mean the denial of resources at best and regime removal at worst.

The US, which has never been enthusiastic in waging war in Korea, would be free to concentrate elsewhere, such as Syria. Moreover, for the US, the real gain is in what it would not lose, i.e. the expenditure of thousands of American lives and billions of dollars to achieve what an inexpensive agreement would. Even the withdrawal of US forces as the price of an agreement would bring gain in terms of cost savings and reduced tension between US military personnel and Korean civilians. If necessary, US forces could rapidly deploy to South Korea, as rapid deployments to the Middle East have demonstrated. Politically, a US withdrawal would shift the burden of alliance preservation much more dramatically to Seoul. Moreover, a trade-off of US forces in Korea for North Korean weapons of mass destruction would remove one of China’s strongest rationales for supporting the DPRK.

CONCLUSION

Of the three outcomes, a regional security framework offers the greatest good for the greatest number, a painfully obvious conclusion. Not only does such an outcome not transgress the security interests of the parties upon closer examination, the results of a regional security framework would probably lead to greater economic cooperation among all member states. North Korea at a minimum could see its infrastructure replaced at virtually no cost, and South Korea could be connected to major markets in northern China, the Russian Far East and beyond. Japan could rest easy and employ construction workers, not missile builders. What prevents this scenario is the lack of a fundamental prerequisite: trust. The animosity created by over fifty years of conflict and confrontation has taken its toll in weakening or obstructing the very basic prerequisites to peace in the region. In this sense, North Korea’s highly idiosyncratic negotiating style may very well be its own worst enemy, preventing it from achieving its most fundament need (regime survival) in the long run.